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ACCEPTING EVOLUTION IN WORKPLACE 





FREDERICK L. SULLIVAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Basketball was her game - refereeing her skill! Her aim, her 
dream: to work in the same place as Michael Jordan, Larry Bird, 
and "Shaq" - to be a referee in the male professional National Bas­
ketball Association (NBA).1 Visitors to the Basketball Hall of 
Fame in Springfield, Massachusetts can see the whistle and uniform 
that Sandra Ortiz-Del Valle used in 1991 to referee the game where 
she became the first woman to referee a men's professional basket­
ball game.2 For the seventeen years since she graduated from City 
College of New York, where she was the center for the women's 
basketball team,3 this physical education teacher and high school 
basketball coach officiated in men's basketball leagues, including 
even pre-season games for the NBA's New Jersey Nets.4 
Nevertheless, Sandra Ortiz-Del Valle's application to be an 
NBA referee was rejected because she had not refereed men's 
games at the highest college level and because the NBA considered 
* The author is a partner in the management employment law firm of Sullivan, 
Hayes & Quinn. He gratefully acknowledges and thanks Layla Taylor, an in-coming 
associate of Sullivan, Hayes & Quinn, for editorial and research assistance, but more 
importantly for her critical assessment and suggestions regarding issues and content 
which were instrumental in developing this Article. The author also thanks his wife, 
Judy, for her continuing support and shielding him over many years from life's usual 
distractions and obligations that enabled him to indulge his professional interests. 
1. Woman Referees Men's Pro Game, U.P.I., July 15, 1991 (quoting Ms. Ortiz 
Del-Valle) ("I officiate because 1 love the game and while 1 don't know if I'm breaking 
down doors or opening minds, 1 do want to be recognized as a qualified referee first and 
not just because I'm a female.") (available via LexisNexis wire news stories search). See 
also Rudy Larini, Spurned Ref Relishes Jury's Call, THE STAR-LEDGER, April 11, 1998, 
available at 1998 WL 3405869 (quoting Ms. Ortiz Del-Valle) ("I wanted to refe­
ree in the NBA because it's the highest caliber of ball out there. 1 was trained for it and 
1 couldn't see why 1 wasn't given the opportunity."). 
2. Woman Referees Men's Pro Game, supra note 1. 
3. Referee'S Jury Award is Severely Reduced, N.Y. TIMES, April 2, 1999, at D6. 
4. Kelly Whiteside, Award Suits Ortiz-Del Valle Just Fine, NEWSDAY, April 11, 
1998, at A32. 
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her out-of-shape.5 In May 1995, Ms. Ortiz-Del Valle began legal 
proceedings with the United States Equal Employment Opportu­
nity Commission ("EEOC") that would lead, four years later, to a 
jury resolving the employment dispute between her and the NBA.6 
She alleged gender discrimination as the reason she was not hired 
and for her resulting emotional distress.? 
During six days of trial in the U.S. District Court in New York 
City, Ms. Ortiz-Del Valle offered no evidence that she needed or 
underwent any counseling or psychiatric treatment because of her 
rejection by the NBA. She did not testify to any concrete emo­
tional problem or any emotional harm that she endured. Moreover, 
there was no evidence of doctor visits or treatment, nor of the dura­
tion of mental anguish, severity or consequences. There was only 
her own uncorroborated testimony that the NBA had never "digni­
fied" that she existed and had made her feel like an "invisible 
person."8 
The six days of trial produced a dispute over what Ms. Ortiz­
Del Valle would have earned had she been hired. The NBA offered 
evidence that she would have actually earned $1,274.23 less as an 
NBA referee than what she had earned from non-NBA employ­
ment during the same time period. However, Ms. Ortiz-Del Valle 
produced evidence that, had she been hired four years earlier, her 
added seniority would have resulted in her earning $76,926.20 more 
during the three-year period in dispute than she actually earned 
from other sources. 
At the close of the trial, the jury awarded her $100,000 in lost 
wages and $750,000 in emotional distress damages.9 The jury did 
not stop there. It awarded her another $7,000,000 in punitive dam­
ages,lO despite the fact that punitive damages are not available 
under New York State human rights law,ll and despite the fact that 
5. Id. 
6. Lars Anderson, I Know I'm Qualified, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 1, 1995, 
available at 1995 WL 12559122. 
7. Id. 
8. This view is supported in the decision that remittitur was proper based on the 
fact that there was virtually no evidence (1) of Ortiz-Del Valle needing or having under­
gone any counseling or psychiatric treatment, or (2) of the duration of the mental 
anguish, its severity, or its consequences that would support the $750,000 award. Ortiz­
Del Valle v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 42 F. Supp. 2d 334, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
9. /d. at 334. 
10. Id. 
11. Under New York human rights law, punitive damages are awarded only in 
cases of housing discrimination, and even then they cannot exceed $10,000. N.Y. 
[EXEC.] LAW § 297.4(iv) (2002). 
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Title VII has a $300,000 limit on compensatory and punitive 
damages.12 
On March 31, 1999, nearly four years after Sandra Ortiz-Del 
Valle filed her original charge, the district court ruled that it would 
vacate the $7,000,000 punitive damages award and order a new trial 
unless Ms. Ortiz-Del Valle accepted a remittitur reducing the puni­
tive damages to $250,000.13 Additionally, the district court decided 
that the jury award of $750,000 for emotional distress damages 
would be vacated and retried unless Ms. Ortiz-Del Valle accepted a 
remittitur reducing the award to $20,000.14 It further ruled that the 
jury could not make a back pay award of $100,000 when only 
$76,926.20 was proven and ordered a remittitur of the back-pay 
award to that amount.15 Thus, after a thorough analysis of the facts 
and applicable law in response to the NBA's motion for judgment 
as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial, the court effec­
tively reduced the damages to four percent of what the jury had 
awarded. The court order meant that she had thirty days to accept 
the reductions in the remittitur or face a new trial on damages.16 
The time spent resolving Ms. Ortiz-Del Valle's employment 
claim spanned four basketball seasons and created untold legal ex­
penses. This case, like many other employment cases, prompts nu­
merous questions. Might the parties have received a fair resolution 
of this workplace dispute more swiftly and avoided the four years of 
court proceedings and lawyers' fees consumed by this litigation? 
Should citizens be taxed to fund such a protracted workplace dis­
pute when the workplace participants could have paid for the fo­
rum? Should taxpayers pay for a process in which the jury fails at 
its job? Should litigants be forced to further backlog the judicial 
system by seeking remittitur caused by jury failure? Is there a bet­
ter process available that could have produced the same ultimate 
result without the need for post-trial motions, with their attendant 
time and costs, and without four years of legal proceedings?17 
12. 42 U.s.c. § 2000e (2002). 
13. Ortiz-Del Valle, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 341. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 344. 
16. Id. at 347. 
17. Although it is not reported what the attorney fees were in this case, it is prob­
ably safe to assume that they were quite high. This practical reality of litigation is sig­
nificant because it is not unusual for attorney's fees to surpass the amount awarded the 
plaintiff in many cases. See, e.g., Gerald Pierce, Pleading Requirements for a Claim For 
Attorney's Fees, 74 FLA. BAR J. 36 (2000) ("As a practical matter, it is not unusual for 
an award of attorney's fees to exceed the amount otherwise in litigation."). 
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This Article examines the current problem of using traditional 
litigation to resolve workplace related disputes, as illustrated in the 
Ortiz-Del Valle case described above, and maintains that the use of 
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate workplace related disputes of­
fers the most promising, fair, and effective vehicle for solving the 
issues involved with litigating claims. Moreover, this Article advo­
cates that arbitration will be most evenhandedly maintained and 
implemented through the development of a statutorily prescribed 
system whereby all employment-related disputes must be submitted 
to privately-funded arbitration. 
In order to achieve its purpose, this Article does four things. 
First, Part I provides a background on the history and law of arbi­
tration in the United States. In particular, Part I describes how ar­
bitration has moved from a device used almost exclusively in the 
labor union context to a mechanism that is used in private em­
ployer-employee relationships. It also describes the changing val­
ues in the workplace that moved this shift along. Part II of this 
Article takes an empirical look at the problems facing workplace 
dispute litigation, and establishes that reducing the volume of em­
ployment related litigation in the courts will have a significant effect 
on decreasing the amount of court backlog, while also providing 
greater access for employees to protect their legal rights with a 
mechanism offering swifter determination of appropriate awards. 
Moreover, Part II demonstrates that arbitration has been proven 
not only as a substitute, but also as an integral part of the American 
legal system that no longer needs to be relegated to second-class 
status. Part III addresses the current critics of mandatory pre-dis­
pute employment arbitration agreements and asserts that any arbi­
tration forum adequately designed addresses and eliminates the 
concerns advanced by those critics. Finally, Part IV concludes by 
advancing the future of arbitration and the proposed model for 
workplace justice - a system where the Federal government man­
dates the use of arbitration as the procedure of resolution in all 
workplace related claims. 
I. ARBITRATION'S HISTORY: How WE GOT HERE 
The early twentieth century was an era of pre-labor relations 
law and pre-protected collective activity; workplace disputes took 
the form of employees' concerted actions in opposition to their em­
ployer. These actions were almost unilaterally squashed by the 
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courtS.lS This was also the era of hostility toward arbitration,19 
where attempts to resolve employment related disputes outside the 
courts were considered suspect.20 However, several key pieces of 
legislation markedly changed the significance of employment rights 
and the significance of arbitration for labor, individual employees, 
and management.21 This section lays out the history of legislative 
promotion of arbitration in the employment context, the case law 
that delineated arbitration's parameters concerning the legislation, 
and the theoretical framework that belies the federal legal system's 
current use and promotion of arbitration agreements in the employ­
ment context. 
A. The Beginning 
1. The Federal Arbitration Act and The Railway Labor Act 
It was nearly eighty years ago, when Congress took the step of 
enacting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)22 and the National 
Railway Labor Act (RLA),23 that the seeds of resolving present day 
workplace issues through arbitration were planted. The FAA, en­
acted in 1925, had the objective of overcoming the judiciary's dis­
trust of alternate methods of dispute resolution by providing the 
same enforcement of arbitration agreements as provided in other 
contractual arrangements.24 To accomplish its objective, § 2 of the 
FAA stated: 
[A] written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy there­
after arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to 
18. The U.S. Supreme Court played an integral part in early American labor his­
tory when it ruled that the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 1-7, made con­
tracts or conspiracies in restraint of trade unlawful, as applied to labor organizations of 
employees. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). 
19. Hostility to arbitration dates back to English common law. Vynior's Case, 4 
Eng. Rep. 289 (K.B. 1609) (deciding that contracts to submit to arbitration are revoca­
ble). Hostility to arbitration was carried over to the early United States. See, e.g., Ho­
bart v. Drogan, 35 U.S. 108, 119 (1836) (stating that arbitration was a "mere amicable 
tribunal"). But see Michael Leroy and Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement of Predispute 
Arbitration Agreements: Back to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 249, 259-69 
(2003) (arguing that the view that early courts where "hostile" to arbitration is not 
entirely accurate). 
20. See generally Hobart, 35 U.S. at 108. 
21. Such legislation includes the Federal Arbitration Act, the Railway Labor Act, 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the Wagner Act and its subsequent amendments. 
22. 9 U.S.c. § 1 (2004). 
23. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2004). 
24. 9 U.S.c. §§ 1-14 (2004). 
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perform the whole or any part thereof ... shall be valid, irrevoca­
ble, and enforceable, save upon grounds as exist at law or in eq­
uity for the revocation of any contract.25 
Moreover, the statute includes provisions to stay federal court 
proceedings of an arbitrable issue26 and for orders compelling arbi­
tration.27 At the time of its passage, the major workplace laws that 
govern most of today's employment relationships had not even 
been proposed or drafted.28 Indeed, the workplace environment of 
the early twentieth century was very different from today's em­
ployer-employee relationship.29 
The second key piece of legislation, the RLA, was passed in 
1926.30 The RLA marked the first time the federal government 
guaranteed private employees the right to bargain collectively.31 
Most important to this discussion, the RLA established a National 
Mediation Board,32 whose job it is to resolve grievances between 
employers and employees at the request of the parties through the 
use of compulsory arbitration.33 Although the true compulsory na­
ture of arbitration under the RLA was questionable because use of 
arbitration remained in the control of the parties with no penalties 
for failing to utilize this procedure,34 the RLA did mark the federal 
government's encouragement of arbitration in the union context 
despite the historic hostility of the American legal system to both 
arbitration and labor power.35 
25. Id. § 2. 
26. Id. § 3 ("If any suit or proceeding is brought in any of the courts of the United 
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such 
arbitration, the court ... shall ... stay the trial of the action ...."). 
27. Id. § 4 (stating that under the proper circumstances and notice "the court 
shall make an order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration ... 
"). 
28. See, e.g., Wagner Act, 28 U.S.c. § 151 (2004); Age Discrimination in Employ­
ment Act, 29 U.S.c. § 621 (2004); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.c. § 12101 
(2004). 
29. See generally Stephen E. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millen­
nium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 386-87 (2002). 
30. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), amended by 98 Stat. 3335 (1984) (current version at 45 
U.S.c. §§ 151-88 (2004». 
31. 45 U.S.c. §§ 155-57 (2004). 
32. Id. § 157 ("[T]he failure or refusal of either party to submit a controversy to 
arbitration shall not be construed as a violation of any legal obligation ...."). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. See H. David Kelly, Jr., An Argument for Retaining the Well Established Dis­
tinction Between Contractual and Statutory Claims in Labor Arbitration, 75 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1997). 
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2. 	 The Rise of Labor and Enforcement of the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement 
The second quarter of the twentieth century marked even 
greater shifts toward the right of employees to bargain and a 
greater government neutrality in labor related disputes. In 1932, 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act36 responded to the federal courts' hostil­
ity toward employee organizing by (1) withdrawing the power of 
the federal courts to issue injunctions in non-violent labor disputes, 
and (2) providing that union activities, such as picketing or work 
stoppages, could not be prohibited.37 Moreover, in 1933, Section 
7(a) was added to the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) as 
a mechanism to protect the rights of employees to join or refrain 
from joining unions and to bargain collectively.38 
Although Section 7(a) was ultimately found unconstitutional 
because it was not considered a valid exercise of Congressional 
power,39 Congress solved the problem in June of 1935 through the 
passage of the Wagner Act.40 The Wagner Act, or National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) , announced that industrial relations affect 
interstate commerce, and an employee and employer refusal to ac­
cept collective bargaining disrupts interstatecommerce.41 There­
fore, Congress has the power to regulate industrial relations and 
restore the equality of bargaining power between employers and 
36. 	 47 Stat. 70 (1932), amended by 98 Stat. 3335 (1984) (current version at 45 
U.S.c. §§ 151-88 (2004». 
37. 	 Id. 
38. National Industrial Recover Act (NIRA), Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 1,48 Stat. 195 
(1933). Enacted in June 1933, the NIRA was one of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 
New Deal measures to help guide the United States economy through the Depression. 
Arguably, the NIRA was revolutionary in that it sanctioned, supported, and en­
couraged the alliance of industries. The NIRA suspended United States antitrust laws 
and companies were required to write industry-wide "codes of fair competition" to fix 
prices and wages, establish production quotas, and impose restrictions on the entry of 
other companies into the alliances. Moreover, the NIRA called for industrial self-regu­
lation and declared that codes of fair competition for the protection of consumers, com­
petitors, and employers, were to be drafted for the various industries of the country and 
were to be subject to public hearings. Most important to this Article, the NIRA 
granted employees the right to organize and bargain collectively and prohibited an em­
ployer's conditioning of employment on an employee joining or refraining from joining 
a labor union. See also Kelly, supra note 35, at 16. 
39. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935) ("Ex­
traordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the argument necessa­
rily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere of 
constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitu­
tional power."). 
40. 	 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2004). 
41. 	 Id. 
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employees.42 The Wagner Act regulated industrial relations by do­
ing several things: (1) it specified the right of employees to form 
unions, refrain from joining a union, and to engage in concerted 
activity; (2) it encouraged labor contracts, negotiated on behalf of 
all employees by a union representative and the employer, to be 
adopted by employers and unions; and (3) it encouraged the resolu­
tion of workplace disputes by collective bargaining between repre­
sentatives of the employee group and the employer.43 Eventually, 
nearly all collective bargaining agreements contained an arbitration 
clause aimed at resolving specific questions arising during the con­
tract's term.44 However, not all employees are covered by the em­
ployer's labor contract.45 For those employees that are covered by a 
labor contract, not all are covered by its arbitration procedure, and 
not all complaints by covered employees are subject to arbitration 
provisions. Many employers do not have a labor contract.46 There­
fore, although the arbitration provisions in labor contracts of em­
ployees covered by resolution processes initially engaged the U.S. 
Supreme Court in questions of workplace arbitration, a large seg­
ment of employment based disputes were without a resolution 
process. 
B. Workplace Justice Begins - Modern Era of Labor Relations 
As discussed above, with the passage of the NLRA in 1935,47 
the resolution of employment disputes in the labor context were 
encouraged to be done through collective activities subject to en­
forcement by the newly created National Labor Relations Board 
42. Id. See also Kelly, supra note 35, at 16-17. 
43. 29 U.S.c. § 151. 
44. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Kiesner, Comment, Special Topics in Labor Relations: 
The Role of Arbitration in Collective Bargaining Dispute Proceedings, Arbitral Treat­
ment of Subcontracting After Milwaukee Spring ll: Much Ado About Nothing?, 44 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 371, 401 n.256 (1989). 
45. For all years in which data is available, it is no surprise that unionized employ­
ees made up a minority of the United States' workforce. In 1983, the first year for 
which the percentage of union participation in the workforce is available from the De­
partment of Labor and the height of United States unionization, the percentage of 
union members in the workforce was 20.1 %. In the year 2003, this number was 12.9%, 
down from 13.2% in 2002. United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statis­
tics, 2000 Union Members Summary, at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm 
(last visited August 21, 2004) (noting that of the total unionized workforce 37.2% of 
public sector employees are unionized while only 8.2% of private sector employees are 
unionized). 
46. See Kelly, supra note 35, at 16-17. 
47. 29 V.S.c. §§ 151-69. 
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(NLRB).48 Opponents of the NLRA lost a constitutional challenge 
to it when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1937 that the Act was 
constitutional.49 
This new law resulted in a surge of union organizing and a 
large number of collective bargaining agreements. But shortly 
thereafter, the country was plunged into World War II. The combi­
nation of a large number of labor agreements governing the work­
place and the need for workplace stability during the World War 
combined into a need for a national workplace dispute resolution 
system that was addressed by a Presidential Executive Order, is­
sued in 1942, creating the National War Labor Board.50 During the 
following year, the War Labor Disputes Act authorized the Board 
to determine the outcome of workplace disputes.51 The Board re­
quired use of arbitration to resolve disputes of interpretation or ap­
plication of a labor agreement. It was the beginning of widespread 
use of arbitration to resolve workplace grievances. 
Since that time and until the present era, an individual's work­
place dispute was resolvable through a union grievance procedure if 
the employee had one available to her, or pursuant to the terms of 
an individual employment agreement if an employee had one with 
the employer, or under a personnel policy where an employer 
adopted a procedure. In the absence of a collective or individual 
grievance procedure, an employee is considered to be an "em­
ployee-at-will," that is, a person who could be terminated from em­
ployment at any time, for any reason that is not unlawful. 
The 1960s saw the enactment of various federal and state anti­
discrimination statutes which restricted employment-at-will and 
gave rise to legal avenues by which individuals could seek redress of 
their workplace disputes. These enactments signaled the beginning 
of a transition from workplace justice being obtained only on a col­
48. Id. § 153. 
49. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 
(1937). 
50. The National War Labor Board was charged with acting as an arbitration tri­
bunal in labor-management dispute cases during World War II in order to prevent work 
stoppages that might hinder the war effort. It was also responsible for determining 
wage adjustments in accordance with anti-inflationary wage stabilization criteria and 
policies. Initially divided into twelve Regional Administrative Boards which handled 
both labor dispute settlement and wage stabilization functions for specific geographic 
regions, the National Board decentralized even more in 1943 by establishing special 
tripartite commissions and panels to deal with particular industries on a national basis. 
Kelly, supra note 35, at 18-19. 
51. War Labor Disputes Act, ch. 144, §§ 1-11, 57 Stat. 163-68 (1943). 
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lective basis to the pursuit of the resolution of workplace contro­
versy on an individual basis. 
Avenues for resolution of individual claims were further en­
hanced during the 1980s and 1990s when many state courts were 
receptive to individual workplace claims based on state laws gov­
erning contracts and torts. Theories of expressed and implied con­
tract based on policy statements, employer handbooks, offer letters, 
and managers' statements were often the basis upon which individ­
ual workplace controversies were resolved in individual litigation. 
Thus, the marriage of statutory individual rights for employees and 
the courts' growing willingness to entertain common law claims in 
the employment context created a shift whereby "I have my rights" 
and "I have my cause of action" were heard to supplement, "I have 
a union," when it came to the pursuit of workplace justice during 
the mid and late 1990s.52 In other words, Congress and the states 
began providing the minimum protections for employees that were 
originally the province of union collective bargaining. The case law 
marking the changing direction of arbitration's use in the employ­
ment context during this era of individual right protection is dis­
cussed below. 
1. Arbitration's Role In Labor Relations 
The year 1957 marked the beginning of the Supreme Court's 
development of a framework for a common law governing labor 
agreements when, in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,53 it enforced 
a labor contract arbitration provision ruling that an employer 
should be ordered to arbitrate a union workplace grievance.54 Ar­
52. William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: 
Everything Old Is New Again. 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 272 (2002). 
The NLRA and the collective bargaining approach is the law of the past, and 
the individual employment rights regime is the law of the present-and proba­
bly the future. The bottom line is that unions have not done the job of pro­
tecting a substantial portion of American workers, regardless of who or what 
is to blame for that fact, and the decline of collective rights and collective 
bargaining has been predictable. Congress has given up on the group rights 
and collective action model of the NLRA and adopted the individual rights 
model for regulating the workplace. 
Id. See also Lord Wedderburn, Labour Law: Autonomy from the Common Law?, 9 
COMPo LAB. L.J., 219 (1988) (providing a discussion about the tension between individ­
ual and union rights in a comparative context). 
53. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
54. In holding that the agreement to arbitrate could be ordered by a court, Justice 
Douglas stated that when passing the NLRA and its amendments, Congress was con­
cerned with uninterrupted production and recognition that an agreement to arbitrate by 
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guably most important is that, in the Lincoln Mills holding, the Su­
preme Court declared that § 301 of the NLRA directed the federal 
courts to develop a common law which draws upon state and fed­
erallabor policy that would aid in interpreting collective bargaining 
agreements.55 Three years later, the Supreme Court issued three 
decisions known as the Steelworkers Trilogy, which laid out the 
foundation for the United States common law on the arbitrability of 
a collective bargaining agreement. Each case was brought by the 
United Steelworkers Union to enforce a labor agreement's arbitra­
tion provision. 
In the first of the trilogy cases, United Steelworkers ofAmerica 
v. American Manufacturing Co. ,56 the Court ruled that where the 
subject matter of a grievance was arbitrable, the arbitration proce­
dure should be enforced rather than the court delving into the po­
tential merits of the grievance. 57 It held that the questions as to 
whether the grievance had or lacked merit was a question of con­
tract interpretation reserved for the arbitrator and was not a func­
tion of the court.58 The second Steelworkers' case, United 
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. ,59 in­
volved a question of the arbitrability of the underlying workplace 
controversy. The Supreme Court decided that the arbitration deci­
sion should be enforced unless it is clear that the arbitration clause 
does not cover the asserted dispute, and further, that any doubt 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration coverage.60 Reiterating 
the reasoning of Lincoln Mills, the Court stated that the presump­
tion of arbitrability was necessary because the parties contracting 
for arbitration understand it as a quid pro quo for a no-strike clause 
and because public policy supports arbitration as a substitute for 
disruptive union activity.61 In the third case, United Steelworkers of 
the employer is a quid pro quo for a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agree­
ment. Id. at 455. 
55. Id. 
56. 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
57. Id. at 568. According to the test the court must look only to see if the con­
tract clearly evidenced an intent to exclude that class of disputes. If the contract does 
not clearly exclude the issue from arbitration, the parties must proceed with arbitration. 
Id. 
58. Id. 
59. 363 U.S. 574 (1960). 
60. Id. at 582-83. 
61. Compare id. with Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957) 
("Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agree­
ment not to strike."). 
292 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:281 
America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. ,62 the Supreme Court 
faced the question of whether an arbitrator's award should be en­
forced and the extent of review in which a court should engage 
when presented with the question of enforcing an arbitration 
award.63 It decided that a court should not refuse to enforce an 
arbitrator's award merely because the court disagreed with the arbi­
trator's interpretation and could justify refusal only where the arbi­
trator manifested an "infidelity" to the agreement and to the 
arbitrator's obligation.64 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the central principles of the Steelworker's Trilogy. 65 
Beyond laying the common law groundwork for arbitration in 
the labor context, the Steelworkers Trilogy is also important for 
how it distinguished labor arbitration from other forms of arbitra­
tion. In particular, the Steelworkers Trilogy affirmatively distin­
guished labor arbitration from commercial arbitration by explaining 
that in a labor dispute, "arbitration is the substitute for industrial 
strife" and in the commercial context, "arbitration is the substitute 
for litigation."66 Arguably, the Court was establishing that arbitra­
tion was more than a substitute adversarial forum; it is a preferred 
vehicle in the employment context because it works to aid employ­
ers and employees in finding and maintaining common ground­
ultimately maintaining industrial cohesiveness and longevity.67 
2. 	 Arbitration's Role In Achieving Workplace Justice For 
Individuals 
With the creation of individual workplace causes of action,68 it 
was not long before the Supreme Court decided the issue of 
whether the arbitration of an employee's discharge pursuant to a 
collective bargaining agreement is a bar to the individual's pursuit 
of an anti-discrimination claim against the employer. In Alexander 
62. 	 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
63. 	 Id. at 596-99. 
64. 	 Id. at 597. 
65. 	 See, e.g., AT&T Tech. Inc. v. Communication Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986). 
66. United Steel Workers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 
574, 578 (1960). 
67. See Kelly, supra note 35, at 27 ("[T]he [Supreme] Court viewed labor arbitra­
tion as performing an essential function it believed the courts could not perform. "). 
68. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 V.S.c. § 2000e-2(a) (1994); Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA), 42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1990); Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), 29 U.S.c. §§ 621-34 (1988); Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 V.S.c. 
§§ 201-14 (1988). 
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v. Gardner-Denver Co. ,69 the Court held that an employee had a 
right to pursue both a Title VII claim in court and a labor contract 
grievance in labor arbitration.70 The Court reasoned that each 
claim has "legally independent origins."71 According to the Court, 
the individual employee's grievance pursuant to the collective bar­
gaining agreement consists of vindicating his or her contracted-for 
rights while the Title VII lawsuit is the individual employee's at­
tempt to vindicate statutory rights provided by Congress.72 The 
Court acknowledged that although the right to strike, for example, 
was statutorily conferred on the employee, it is appropriately bar­
gained away by a union as it encompasses a collective right,?3 In 
contrast, Title VII rights are conferred on individuals, rather than 
the collective bargaining unit, and cannot be contracted away by 
the union,?4 Thus, an employee's subsequent Title VII court action 
was not barred by use of a union contract's grievance arbitration 
procedures on essentially the same question.75 
The Alexander ruling was subsequently applied and upheld by 
the Supreme Court in the following cases: a Fair Labor Standards 
Act case brought by an employee after an adverse ruling in a labor 
contract arbitration on essentially the same facts;76 a discharge 
cause of action under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 where there had been a 
prior just cause arbitration ruling under a labor contract;77 and a 
case brought under the Federal Employer's Liability Act for dam­
ages resulting from a workplace injury where the employer sought 
to enforce arbitration of the issue under the RLA's mandatory arbi­
tration provision.78 This line of cases turned in large part upon the 
arbitrator's duty to enforce the labor contract between the labor 
union and the employer as opposed to the arbitrator's duty to rely 
upon applicable public law,?9 Many commentators at the time sug­
69. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
70. Id. at 53-54. 
71. Id. at 52. 




76. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981). 
77. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984). 
78. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 570-71 (1987). 
79. These cases pointed out that arbitration through the procedures prescribed in 
a collective bargaining agreement are not adequate for the resolution of claims regard­
ing the breach of individual statutory rights because (I) even if the agreement conflicts 
with external law, the arbitrator is bound to enforce it; (2) there is a risk that the indi­
vidual's interest might be compromised for the interest of the collective bargaining unit; 
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gested that this meant that individual employees could never con­
tract to arbitrate statutory rights.80 However, in a footnote to its 
Alexander decision,81 the Supreme Court gave a favorable nod to 
the use of arbitration, stating that courts may give great weight to a 
labor arbitrator's ruling that considered an employee's Title VII 
rights under certain circumstances. The Court described the cir­
cumstance when that may occur as: (1) where the issue is solely one 
of fact; (2) where it is specially addressed by the parties; (3) where 
the labor contract provisions substantially conform with Title VII; 
(4) where there is a degree of procedural fairness in the arbitration; 
(5) where there is an adequate record; and (6) where there is a spe­
cial competence of the arbitrator.82 
Alexander provides the step from a collective labor contract to 
an individual employment contract. As stated in Alexander, it is a 
court's duty to maintain availability of a court forum for an individ­
ual's Title VII claim; however, nothing precludes an individual from 
contracting to substitute another forum to hear the claim, especially 
where the substitute forum satisfies the desired criteria.83 
and (3) due process can be circumvented by contract. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60 
n.21; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 728; McDonald, 466 U.S. at 284. 
80. See, e.g., Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 
1990) (explaining that the Alexander rationale was "broad enough to speak to any arbi­
tration of Title VII claims"); Bierdeman v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 
211, 214 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that "plaintiff could not prospectively waive her 
right to a judicial determination of her Title VII claim"). 
81. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. Several years later, in a unanimous decision in Wright v. Universal Mar. 
Servo Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998), the Supreme Court held that an employee is entitled to 
pursue his federal statutory claim under the ADA if the collective bargaining agree­
ment negotiated by his union did not contain a "clear and unmistakable waiver" of his 
right to a judicial forum. Id. at 80. Most courts have interpreted this to mean that 
mandatory arbitration agreements in collective bargaining agreements do not deprive 
employees of their statutory right to individual claims, an interpretation which seems 
consistent with Alexander. See, e.g., Kennedy V. Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650 
(6th Cir. 2000); Mohave Elec. Coop, Inc. V. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 206 F.3d 1183 
(D.C. Cir. 2000); Rogers V. New York Univ., 220 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2000). However, 
because Wright held that the collective bargaining agreement at issue was too general, 
the argument exists that the Supreme Court either implicitly overruled Alexander or 
left that avenue open for a later case. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
clearly adopts the latter view in Safrit V. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2001), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 995 (2001). Although the scope of Wright currently remains un­
certain, Safrit seems to suggest that in the near future collective bargaining agreements, 
as well as individual employee waivers, might bind employees to arbitration of their 
individual statutory claims. 
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3. 	 The Development of Arbitration Outside the Labor 
Context 
As discussed above, until the 1980s, cases pitting workplace ar­
bitration against an individual's right to court litigation arose within 
the context of collective labor contracts. Moreover, early federal 
cases appeared to limit the scope of the FAA in upholding pre-dis­
pute agreements to arbitrate when a claim involved statutorily pre­
scribed rights.84 However, in a series of cases in the 1980s dubbed 
the Mitsubishi Trilogy, the Supreme Court used the FAA to ex­
pand the reach of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate.85 In these 
cases, the Supreme Court interpreted the FAA as creating a pre­
sumption of arbitrability,86 and stated that "[h]aving made the bar­
gain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress 
itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial reme­
dies for the statutory rights at issue."87 The Court made clear that 
Congress did not intend to prohibit arbitration of statutory claims, 
unless the language or legislative history of the statute in question 
expressly indicates otherwise.88 Furthermore, the Court explained 
that the burden is on the party opposing arbitration to show that 
Congress intended to preclude a waiver of existing remedies.89 Ad­
ditionally, the Court explicitly rejected arguments questioning the 
competence of arbitrators and the sufficiency of arbitral proce­
dures.90 The Mitsubishi Trilogy cases clearly opened the door to 
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate in the individual employer-em­
ployee context. 
84. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). According to the holding in 
Wilko, statutory claims were not subject to arbitration under the FAA because the pro­
tective provisions of the statute in question required a judicial forum to assure their 
effectiveness. Id. at 435. Thus, the presumption of arbitrability articulated by the FAA 
was overcome because the Court believed that arbitration was inadequate to protect 
the public interest in the dispute. Id. 
85. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628­
29 (1985) (compelling enforcement of a private contract to arbitrate claims arising 
under the Sherman Antitrust Act); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 
490 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1989) (mandating enforcement of a private contract to arbitrate 
claims arising under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933); ShearsonlAm. Exp., 
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987) (compelling enforcement of a private 
contract to arbitrate claims arising under section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO». 
86. 	 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625-26. 
87. 	 Id. at 628. 
88. 	 Id. 
89. 	 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227. 
90. 	 Id. at 231-33. 
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C. 	 The Present Climate: The Supreme Court Gives the Go-Ahead 
to Pre-Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate in the 
Employment Context 
1. 	 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 91 
The Supreme Court first explicitly addressed the issue of the 
enforceability of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate between an in­
dividual employee and employer in 1991.92 In Gilmer v. Interstate! 
Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court determined whether a 
stockbroker's claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA) should be resolved in arbitration pursuant to the 
agreement between the broker, Gilmer, and the New York Stock 
Exchange which was contained in Gilmer's original application for 
registration.93 Gilmer's hiring by the defendant required that he be 
registered as a securities representative by the New York Stock Ex­
change.94 The uniform registration application provided that Gil­
mer "agree[d] to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy" 
between him and his employer that arose out of employment or 
termination of employment.95 Interstate terminated sixty-two-year­
old Gilmer after six years of employment.96 Gilmer filed a claim at 
the EEOC and subsequently brought an ADEA lawsuit in U.S. dis­
trict court.97 
The district court denied Interstate's motion to compel arbitra­
tion pursuant to the application agreement and the Federal Arbitra­
tion Act.98 The court relied on the Supreme Court's Alexander 
decision99 and on its own conclusion that ADEA claimants were to 
be protected from waiving a judicial forum.toO In reversing the dis­
trict court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found 
that nothing in the ADEA indicated a congressional intent to pre­
clude arbitration.101 On final appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and concluded that there had 
not been a sufficient showing that, in enacting the ADEA, Con­
91. 	 500 u.s. 20 (1991). 
92. 	 Id. 
93. 	 Id. at 23. 
94. 	 Id. 
95. 	 Id. 
96. 	 Id. 
97. 	 Id. at 23-24. 
98. 	 Id. at 24. 
99. 	 See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text. 
100. 	 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24. 
101. 	 Id. 
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gress intended to preclude arbitration of ADEA claims.102 
The Supreme Court ruled that Gilmer's reliance on the Alex­
ander, Barrentine, and McDonald decisions was misplaced because 
those cases did riot involve the issue of the enforceability of arbi­
trating statutory claims.103 Instead, the Court indicated that the is­
sue in those cases was whether a labor contract arbitration 
provision precluded subsequent court action on a statutory claim.lo4 
The Court stated that the employees in those cases had not agreed 
to arbitrate their individual statutory claims and as a result, arbitra­
tors were not authorized to resolve the statutory claim under a la­
bor agreement arbitration provision. lOS 
In reaching its Gilmer decision, the Supreme Court dealt with 
a number of objections to arbitration that had been raised by Gil­
mer. First, the Court found no inconsistency between the EEOC's 
statutory role to enforce important social policy and a court enforc­
ing an individual's agreement to arbitrate an age discrimination 
claim.l°6 In support of this conclusion, the Court noted its Mitsub­
ishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc. IO? decision and 
its holding that the Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) 
Act, and the Securities Act of 1933 all advance important social 
policy and have been found by the Court to be appropriate for 
arbitration.108 
Further, the Court opined that arbitration will not undermine 
the enforcement role of the EEOC.109 It stated that, although not 
able to bring a private cause of action, an individual subject to an 
arbitration agreement retains the right to file an EEOC charge.1l0 
Noting that "the EEOC's role. " is not dependent on the filing of 
a charge,"11l the Court observed that "nothing in the ADEA indi­
cates that Congress intended that the EEOC be involved in all em­
ployment disputes. "112 The Court then stated that the "mere 
involvement" of an administrative agency in statutory enforcement 
102. Id. at 35. 
103. Id. at 33, 35. 
104. Id. at 35. 
105. Id 
106. Id. at 27. 
107. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
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is insufficient grounds to prohibit arbitration. l13 
As to Gilmer's argument that a compulsory pre-dispute arbi­
tration agreement improperly "deprives claimants of the judicial fo­
rum provided for by the ADEA," the Court held that Congress 
"did not explicitly preclude arbitration or other nonjudicial resolu­
tion of claims ...."114 It even found that arbitration agreements 
allow claimants a "broader right to select the forum for resolving 
disputes ...."115 After briefly reviewing the arbitrator selection 
process in Gilmer's situation and the FAA's protections against bias 
awards, the Court rejected Gilmer's claim that arbitration panels 
will be biased,116 
Gilmer also argued that the limited discovery allowed in arbi­
tration would make it more onerous for a plaintiff to prove discrim­
ination.117 However, the Court dismissed the due process objection 
and found it was unlikely that "age discrimination claims require 
more extensive discovery" than other statutory claims where arbi­
tration was upheld.1l8 Moreover, the court noted that the "simplic­
ity ... and expedition of arbitration" acted as fair trade for the 
more extensive federal court procedure.119 
Gilmer further claimed that the lack of a written arbitrator's 
opinion would deny the public "knowledge of employers' discrimi­
natory policies" and hinder the evolution of the law,120 The Court 
dismissed this argument for two reasons. First, it found that the 
instant procedure resulted in public written awards.l2l Second, the 
Court surmised that it was "unlikely that all or even most ADEA 
claimants will be subject to arbitration agreements."122 Thus, there 
was still room for legal development. The Court further noted that 
this concern "could apply equally to settlements of ADEA claims," 
which are clearly permitted by the statute.123 
The Court also addressed the argument raised by Gilmer con­
113. Id. at 28-29 (noting the Securities Exchange Commission's role in enforcing 
the Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 does preclude mandatory arbitration). 
114. Id. at 29. 
115. Id. (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsoniAmerican Exp. Inc., 490 U.S. 
477, 483 (1989». 
116. Id. at 30-31. 
117. Id. at 31. 




122. Id. at 32. 
123. Id. 
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cerning the "unequal bargaining power between employers and em­
ployees."124 On this point, the Court found that the FAA's 
objective was to render arbitration agreements comparable to other 
contracts by ensuring that "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power" 
would not make an arbitration agreement unenforceable.125 
The Court declined to consider what was to be the eventual 
issue in Circuit City Stores v. Adams,126 that is, whether the FAA 
excluded all contracts of employment from its coverage. The Court 
stated that Gilmer had not raised that question, that the lower 
courts had not addressed it, and that "it was not among the ques­
tions presented in the petition for certiorari."127 The Court also ob­
served that the arbitration agreement in Gilmer constituted part of 
an agreement with the securities exchanges and was not contained 
in an employment agreement.128 
2. Circuit City Stores v. Adams 
In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issues left open 
by Gilmer in Circuit City,129 In October 1995, the plaintiff, Saint 
Clair Adams, applied for a job at a Circuit City store in Santa Rosa, 
California,13° He completed and signed the store's application 
form, which contained the following binding arbitration agreement: 
I agree that I will settle any and all previously unasserted claims, 
disputes or controversies arising out of or relating to my applica­
tion or candidacy for employment, employment and/or cessation 
of employment with Circuit City, exclusively by final and binding 
arbitration before a neutral Arbitrator. By way of example only, 
such claims include claims under federal, state, and local statu­
tory or common law, such as the Age Discrimination in Employ­
ment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 
including the amendments of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, the law of contract and the law 
of tort.131 
After two years of employment Adams resigned and filed suit 
124. Id. at 33. 
125. /d. 
126. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
127. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. 
128. [d. 
129. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 113 ("[T]he issue reserved in Gilmer is presented 
here."). 
130. Id. at 109-10. 
131. [d. 
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because of alleged employment discrimination in violation of Cali­
fornia law,132 Circuit City responded by petitioning the U.S. district 
court to stay the lawsuit and compel Adams to arbitrate his 
claims,133 The U.S. district court blocked the lawsuit, ordered arbi­
tration, and ruled that the FAA required enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.134 The Ninth Circuit, on appeal by Adams, ruled that 
when an arbitration agreement is in an employment contract, it is 
not subject to the FAA.135 However, that Ninth Circuit ruling con­
flicted with rulings that had been issued by all of the other circuit 
courts.136 
The legal dispute in Circuit City turned on an interpretation of 
terms in the FAA. The FAA's wording raised the question of 
whether an agreement made by any employee working in "com­
merce" is excluded from the coverage of the FAA, or whether only 
agreements made by employees working in the transportation in­
dustry are specifically excluded.137 After a lengthy discussion of the 
canons of construction and legislative history, the Court ruled, in a 
5 to 4 decision, that only contracts involving transportation workers 
are exempt from the FAA, and that employment agreements con­
taining arbitration provisions made by other employees are 
enforceable.138 
In its decision, the Supreme Court did not identify any ele­
ments that an arbitration process should include, leaving employers 
to develop their own procedures.B9 A number of courts, on a case­
by-case basis, have reviewed procedures adopted by specific em­
ployers. While no specific procedure has been identified, this case­
by-case process has resulted in identification of due process factors 
that usually meet court approval when challenged.140 




136. Id. at 110-11. 
137. See id. at 111 ("A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable ....") (quoting 9 U.S.c. § 2). 
138. Id. at 119. 
139. This entitles employers to determine which controversies are to be covered; 
which employees will have agreements blocking court action; and which pre-arbitration 
step or steps, such as mediation, a grievance procedure, or an internal peer hearing, will 
be required. Ultimately, what will constitute an enforceable waiver of an employee's 
right to bring a lawsuit will be determined on an individual basis. 
140. For example, there has been much debate in the courts over whether a fee­
301 2004] ACCEPTING EVOLUTION IN WORKPLACE JUSTICE 
Although not the point of Circuit City, the Supreme Court nev­
ertheless spoke to those positions, hostile to arbitration, that had 
been taken by a number of state anti-discrimination agencies. The 
Court opined that there are real benefits to arbitration in an em­
ployment context, including avoidance of litigation costS.141 In an­
swering arguments made by the attorneys general of twenty-one 
states in support of Adams' opposition to mandatory arbitration, 
the Court said that a prior Supreme Court decision held that the 
FAA applied in state courts and pre-empted state anti-arbitration 
laws.142 
The Court further observed that arbitration agreements can be 
enforced without contravening laws that give employees specific 
protection against discrimination.143 Referencing Gilmer, the 
Court said that by consenting to arbitrate a statutory claim, an em­
ployee does not surrender the substantive rights granted by the stat­
ute; rather, the employee only submits resolution to an arbitral 
forum instead of a court.144 
3. The Waffle House Case 
Finally, on January 15, 2002, the Supreme Court was called 
upon to rule in another employment-related arbitration case when 
it issued a 6-3 split decision in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. 145 In 
that case, the Court reversed a Fourth Circuit decision which had 
ruled that while the EEOC was not blocked from exercising its en­
forcement powers by an employer-employee arbitration agreement, 
it was precluded from seeking victim-specific relief (e.g., back pay 
splitting provision in a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate is overreaching in the em­
ployment context-and violative of due process. In December of 2000, the Supreme 
Court ruled that a claim arising under a statute designed to further important social 
policy may be arbitrated because "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may 
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum" the statute serves 
its function. Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000). This case 
dealt with the question of "who pays" for the arbitration process. Id. at 82. In challeng­
ing the agreement to arbitrate, Randolph asserted that arbitration costs are high and 
that she did not have the resources to arbitrate. Id. at 83-84. This, she argued, 
amounted to being unable to vindicate her statutory rights. ld. at 83. Ultimately, the 
Court found that the risk that an individual would face prohibitive costs was too specu­
lative to invalidate the arbitration agreement. ld. at 90-91. 
141. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122-23. 
142. ld. at 121-22 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984». 
143. Id. at 123. 
144. Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 
(1991». 
145. 534 U.S. 279 (2002). 
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or reinstatement).146 The Supreme Court ruled that the EEOC was 
not a party to the employee-Waffle House arbitration agreement 
and that the FAA could not be used to compel non-parties to arbi­
trate.147 In addition, the Court found that there was no language in 
the ADA or Title VII (the two discrimination statutes involved in 
the case) that barred the EEOC from seeking relief for a specific 
victim.148 Thus, the Supreme Court's Waffle House ruling was that 
the EEOC is not prevented from exercising its enforcement powers, 
including seeking victim specific remedies, by provisions of the 
FAA or Title VII where there is an employer-employee arbitration 
agreement to which the EEOC is not a party, and in the absence of 
employee conduct that may limit the relief that the EEOC can 
seek.149 
The use of a private arbitration forum did not escape the Jus­
tices' notice. The minority noted that the average employment dis­
crimination case takes nine months to resolve in arbitration, while 
two years in federal court. Thus, by the time that an EEOC case is 
ripe for federal court there may have been a "settlement" if the 
employer construes an arbitrator's award as a settlement, or "res 
judicata" (i.e., either the arbitrator's award or a court ruling enforc­
ing an arbitrator's award). 
The Court also declared that its Waffle House decision will not 
undermine compulsory employment arbitration agreements be­
cause, as the Court noted, in the year 2000 the EEOC had filed only 
291 lawsuits while 21,032 private employment discrimination claims 
had been filed in U.S. district courts.150 It found that less than 2% 
of all anti-discrimination claims are filed by the EEOC; and that 
even in those cases in which the EEOC had found reasonable cause 
during its investigation, it brought less than 5% to a lawsuit.151 The 
Supreme Court saw its opinion affecting very little and dismissed 
the minority's speculation that its decision would discourage em­
146. Id. at 284. 
147. [d. at 294. 
148. [d. at 294-96. 
149. However, the Supreme Court opined that it is an "open question" as to 
whether an arbitration judgment would affect an EEOC's claim or the relief that the 
EEOC can seek. [d. at 297. The Court further said that an employee's conduct may 
limit the relief that the EEOC can obtain, and among conduct to which it referred were 
settlements and the legal doctrine of res judicata. [d. at 297-98. In this case, as the 
Supreme Court noted, neither the employee nor the employer had sought arbitration, 
and the employer's defense to the EEOC's lawsuit (to which the employee was not a 
party) was to ask the court to dismiss it or to compel arbitration. [d. at 284. 
150. [d. at 290 n.7. 
151. [d. 
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ployers from using compulsory arbitration.152 
Except for the Waffle House question, which involved only 
court action by the EEOC in ADA and Title VII claims, all other 
employee wrongful discharge, contract, and tort claims are, and re­
main, blocked by the Supreme Court's Circuit City decision.153 
While the Waffle House decision will also allow other government 
agencies to argue that they can enforce their authority and are not 
prevented from doing so by an employer'3 arbitration policy, most 
individual controversies will be subsumed under the general cate­
gory of employment disputes that will increasingly head towards 
arbitration. 
As demonstrated in the preceding history of arbitration in the 
workplace context, Congress and the courts have had nearly a cen­
tury of experience in dealing with workplace controversies. In that 
time, Congress has promulgated substantive employment laws and 
the federal court has developed its common law, which supports 
arbitration as not only an alternative to litigation, but as a legiti­
mate means of resolving employment-related disputes outside of 
the litigation context. Moreover, the Supreme Court has con­
fronted procedural issues for the enforcement of workplace legal 
rights, holding that arbitration, a private workplace dispute system 
that enforces an employee's substantive rights, can be used instead 
of court litigation so long as the arbitration contract does not abro­
gate stat~tory guara.ntees and provides a fair and accessible 
venue.154 
While present cases involving mandatory pre-dispute arbitra­
tion agreements of workplace-based claims are addressing what 
constitutes a valid arbitration agreement, the vast number of em­
ployment related cases still fall outside of arbitration.155 However, 
there continues to be a plethora of problems in the American state 
and federal legal systems stemming from the volume of workplace 
disputes that are being submitted to litigation. Part II of this Arti­
cle explores the various problems faced by the American state and 
federal legal system stemming from the volume and complexity of 
152. Id. 
153. See discussion infra Part 1.C.2. 
154. See, e.g., Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 296 n.10; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plym­
outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
155. According to one article, only 10% of employees are covered by mandatory 
arbitration agreements. High Court Upholds Forced Arbitration: Clauses Keep Workers 
From Filing Suits, WASHINGTON POST, March 22, 2001, at A01, available at http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com!ac2/wpdyn (last visited Aug. 21, 2004). 
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workplace disputes, and argues that these problems can be greatly 
relieved by the adoption of arbitration. Simply put, the facts 
demonstrate that arbitration provides a better way of resolving 
these disputes. 
II. No MORE LITIGATION, THERE IS A BETTER WAY! 
The opening of this Article presented the case of an employ­
ment dispute between a referee and her employer, the NBA, in­
volving an allegation of discrimination in violation of Title VII.156 
Presented as an example to demonstrate how the current litigation 
system fails to resolve workplace-related disputes, the case merely 
illustrates the questions raised by litigation; it does not explain why 
litigation is a problem in the employment context, nor does it 
demonstrate, as this Article advocates, that arbitration is a better 
system for resolving employment related disputes. This section at­
tempts to address those issues in two ways. First, it takes a look at 
the unique nature of the workplace relationship, demonstrating 
how litigation is a questionable mechanism for resolving workplace 
disputes in a way that is fair and just to all parties. Second, by using 
the available empirical data and the underlying goals of workplace 
dispute resolution, this section describes the benefits of replacing 
traditional courtroom litigation with arbitration as the core element 
of a new workplace justice system. 
A. Litigation is Hostile to Resolving Workplace-Related Disputes 
Workplace complaints differ from typical causes of action. At 
the core of most workplace disputes is a relationship. Often a 
breakdown in that relationship will pose serious consequences for 
both parties. Except for those few economically independent folks, 
nearly everyone in the United States has to regularly be in a work­
place. Income from work puts food on the table, clothes on our 
backs, and maintains the homes we live in. Beyond financial sup­
port, work also provides Americans with status in their communi­
ties. What people do for work defines them, the respect they attain 
in a community and the friendships they maintain.157 Just as impor­
tant, employers cannot survive without workers.158 
156. See discussion supra Introduction. 
157. Donna E. Young, Racial Releases, Involuntary Separations, and Employment 
At-Will, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 351, 351-52 (2001). 
158. See id. at 351-54 (providing similar sentiments on the nature of workplace 
relationships and why those relationships make workplace complaints unique). 
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Given the nature of the workplace and the unique characteris­
tics of workplace-related disputes, it is not surprising that in em­
ployment disputes, especially those involving terminations, the 
parties feel that so much is at stake. Often analogized to divorce 
proceedings,159 workplace litigation carries a grave emotional toll 
for the parties and can greatly affect non-participants.16o Not only 
are the employee and the employer involved in court litigation af­
fected, but so too are co-workers and the families of the major par­
ticipants affected by the facts of employment litigation that might 
center on a claimant and on a named manager.161 
Because facets of human relationships are so vital to an em­
ployee's work and to the effectiveness of an employing organiza­
tion, swift dispute resolution needs to be the aim of workplace 
justice, not a lawyer's victory. Unfortunately, the present system 
orients too many claimants to a "win-lose" process. This, coupled 
with the inevitable protracted period of time devoted solely to pro­
cedure and legal preparation as opposed to resolution,162 causes a 
deterioration in the relationship when the claimant is still employed 
or causes a former employee to focus upon vindication rather than 
upon those personal work characteristics that make a person suc­
cessful as a future employee elsewhere. 
One need only look at the empirical data on workplace litiga­
tion to understand that it does not work to resolve workplace dis­
putes and that litigation, in fact, runs counter to those values that 
most Americans and the federal government have articulated as be­
ing central to the workplace - efficiency, harmony, and fairness.163 
159. See, e.g., Walter Olson, Economic Analysis of State Employment Law Issues 
Symposium: The Excuse Factory: Question and Answer Session, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'y 43, 44-45 (1999) ("[M)any lawyers who practice in this area, as well as outsiders, 
have said the closest thing to employment litigation that they have ever seen is divorce 
litigation."); George H. Singer, Employing Alternative Dispute Resolution: Working at 
Finding Better Ways to Resolve Employer-Employee Strife, 72 N.D. L. REV. 299, 299 
("Employment litigation is a little like holy war and a lot like divorce. "). 
160. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 159, at 44 (stating that employment litigation, 
despite a financial victory, can be accompanied by "derailment of a professional career, 
miserable psychological results, [and) breaches with all sorts of people who have been 
forced to take sides who might have remained friends otherwise"). 
161. /d. 
162. Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191,212 n.ll (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozin­
ski, J., dissenting) ("Judicial proceedings ... are expensive and protracted. . . . They 
require the courts to second-guess management decisions made years earlier ... [and) 
largely ignore the legitimate interests of others, including those of fellow workers ... 
affected by the decision."). 
163. See, e.g., 29 U.S.c. § 151 (2004); Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Int'I Bhd. of 
Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 472 (1953) {noting that the Labor Management Relations 
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For example, workplace litigation increased by over 400 percent in 
the thirty years between 1970 and 1999.164 Moreover, statistical 
analysis shows that job-related claims of employment discrimina­
tion and wrongful discharge tried by jury in the federal district 
courts between 1978 and 2000 had a median jury award of $89,000, 
with an average award of over $1,000,000.165 Beyond just the po­
tential awards for an aggrieved plaintiff, defending workplace­
based claims is purported to cost hundreds of thousands of dollars 
in some jurisdictions if taken to trial,166 and the average case takes 
over two years to complete if it actually makes it through trial and 
is disposed of by a jury verdict.167 
Not only is employment litigation costly when it does happen, 
but employment litigation makes up a significant amount of the fed­
eral court docket. For example, in 2004, civil rights cases involving 
employment disputes made up over 10% of the federal courts of 
appeals docket.168 Further, federal statistics reveal that of the 
255,851 cases commenced in Federal Court during the twelve 
month period ending March 31, 2004, 19,912 of those cases - i.e. 
Act "seeks to strengthen, rather than to weaken, that cooperation, continuity of service, 
and cordial contractual relation between employer and employee that is born of loyalty 
to their common enterprise"); Oneita Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 
375 F.2d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 1967) ("The policy of the National Labor Relations Act is to 
foster and encourage industrial harmony ...."). 
164. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 29, at 399-400 (reporting that between 1971 and 
1991 the number of employment related disputes increased 430% in the federal courts, 
between 1992-1995 the number of employment related disputes increased another 
128%, that in the past thirty years employment litigation has grown at a rate almost 10 
times greater than other civil litigation, and that in May of 1999 there were approxi­
mately 25,000 wrongful discharge and employment cases pending across the country). 
165. This statistical analysis was generated on the Cornell University research 
database inputting the following criteria: (1) all completed jury trials; (2) Job Category 
#442 (which includes all non-labor employment litigation); (3) calendar years between 
1978-2000; (4) all federal courts; (5) all basis for jurisdiction; and (6) all origins of cases. 
Moreover, the award figures and demand amounts were adjusted for the year 2000 CPI 
for all years. Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Judicial Statistical Inquiry 
Form, at http://teddy.law.comell.edu:8090/questata.htm(lastvisitedSept.11, 2004). 
166. See Stuart Bompey, The Attack on Arbitration and Mediation of Employ­
ment Disputes, 13 LAB. LAW. 21, 22 (1997). 
167. Eisenberg & Clermont, supra note 165. The mean and median time that it 
took for employment related litigation to be disposed of at trial from the time of filing 
to the end of litigation from the period between 1997-2000 are 674 days and 580 days 
respectively. Id. 
168. See U.S. Court of Appeals-Nature of Suit or Offense in Cases Arising from 
the U.S. District Courts, by Circuit, During the Twelve-Month Period Ending March 31, 
2002, at www.uscourts.gov/caseload2002/tables/b07mar02.pdf(lastvisitedSept.11. 
2004) (federal statistics showing that there were 26,032 private suits before the Federal 
Courts of Appeals in 2002 and that 2,718 of those cases involved civil rights disputes of 
employment related matters). 
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8% involved civil rights disputes of employment related 
matters.169 
Workplace dispute litigation is also problematic because, at 
present, it prevents some aggrieved parties access to the court sys­
tem. For example, it is possible that many aggrieved parties are 
denied access to reparations for statutorily based discrimination 
claims precisely because of backlog and lack of representation pO 
For instance, currently there are over 80,000 claims of discrimina­
tion in employment pending before the EEOC, and, although the 
agency has dramatically cut its backlog from a high in 1995, it still 
has over 34,000 cases that have yet to be terminated. l7l The U.S. 
Supreme Court reported that the EEOC filed less than two percent 
of the antidiscrimination claims filed in federal court and brought a 
court claim in less than five percent of the cases in which it found 
reasonable cause.172 
On top of this, evidence makes clear that as a practical matter, 
most potential litigants will never get a day in court. For example, 
one recent study of employment discrimination cases filed in the 
Southern District of New York uncovered some startling realities 
about litigation of workplace related discrimination disputes. Of 
the over 3000 employment discrimination cases filed and resolved 
in the period between April 1, 1997 and July 31, 2001, only one 
hundred and twenty-five of those cases resulted in trial.173 In addi­
tion, one survey that investigated a sample of 321 plaintiff's attor­
neys found these lawyers accepted only 5% of the employment 
discrimination cases offered to them by prospective plaintiffs and 
that the average threshold for taking a case was "provable damages 
of $60,000 to $65,000, a retainer of $3,000 to $3,600, and a 35% 
contingency fee."174 Moreover, despite the high costs of litigation, 
169. See U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of Jurisdiction 
and Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2004, at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/tables/c02mar04.pdf(lastvisitedSept.11. 2004). 
170. See, e.g., Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil 
Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 29 (1998) (providing not only statistical support, 
but also, describing in-depth how the current court system prevents aggrieved persons 
from accessing the courts). 
171. Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Request and Annual Performance Plan, available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/plan/2002budget/comprehensive_enforcement.htm!. 
172. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 290 n.7 (2002). 
173. Michael Delikat & Morris Kleiner, Comparing Litigation and Arbitration of 
Employment Disputes: Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights in Litigation?, 6 
A.B.A. SEC. OF LrnG. 1 (2003). 
174. Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employ­
ment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO 
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the most recent data indicates that only 11 % of plaintiffs are suc­
cessful at any stage of litigation.175 
B. Arbitration Provides a Better Alternative to Litigation 
Clearly, the above statistics indicate that there is a problem 
with the litigation of workplace disputes. Litigation is costly. Liti­
gation is slow. Not all parties with legitimate claims, especially 
those employees with few resources or small claims, have access to 
the litigation system. These factors are problematic in the employ­
ment law context, where the objectives of most federal policies 
have been workplace harmony,176 workplace efficiency,177 and en­
suring that the workplace operates evenhandedly - particularly for 
members of certain groups historically denied equal access or treat­
ment.178 Still, the question remains: how does arbitration provide a 
solution to the litigation problem? 
In contrast to the empirical research which shows that litiga­
tion is not effective, empirical research on arbitration demonstrates 
that it is more amenable to solving workplace disputes in terms of 
cost, efficiency, and accessibility. Indeed, only those lawyers more 
concerned with the business of law than workplace justice may feel 
left out of the benefits of arbitrationP9 This section describes the 
beneficial results of replacing traditional courtroom litigation with 
arbitration as the core element in a new workplace justice system. 
ST. J. ON Drsp. RESOL. 777, 783 n.24 (2003) (citing William M. Howard, Arbitrating 
Claims of Employment Discrimination, Drsp. REsoL. J. 40, 44 (1995)) ("[O]n average, 
plaintiff's lawyers accept one out of every 20 employment discrimination matters for 
which employees ask for representation in court."). 
175. This statistical analysis reflects figures for 2000 and was generated on the 
Cornell University research database inputting the following criteria: (1) all cases, (2) 
Job Category #442 (which includes all non-labor employment litigation), (3) calendar 
years 2000, (4) all federal district courts, (5) all basis for jurisdiction, (6) all origins of 
cases, (7) all procedural stages, and (8) all disposition methods. Eisenberg & Clermont, 
supra note 165. 
176. See 29 U.S.c. § 151 (2004) (endorsing "practices fundamental to the friendly 
adjustment of industrial disputes") (emphasis added); Oneita Knitting Mills, Inc. v. 
Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 375 F.2d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 1967) ("The policy of the Na­
tional Labor Relations Act is to foster and encourage industrial harmony ...."). 
177. See 29 U.S.c. § 151 (2004) ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of the 
United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow 
of commerce ...."). 
178. See generally Age Discrimination Employment Act, 29 U.s.c. § 621 (2004); 
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.c. § 701 (2004); Civil Rights Act, Title VII, 42 U.S.c. 
§ 2000e (2004); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.c. § 12101 (2004). 
179. Only 11 % of plaintiffs are successful at any stage of litigation. See supra 
note 175 and accompanying text. 
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First, statistics suggest that arbitration is not biased in favor of 
employers. In one study comparing arbitration and litigation, Lisa 
Bingham reported that employees win the majority of the time ­
approximately 64% of the cases - in arbitration.180 Compared with 
the figures on litigation win rates,18I this is a significantly high num­
ber tending to refute the notion that the cards are stacked against 
the employee in arbitration. 
Moreover, the evidence suggests that arbitration is cheaper to 
all concerned than litigation. For example, as scholar Curtis Brown 
uncovered in a recent article, fees associated with litigating an em­
ployment case often cost at least $50,000, while the fee range in 
employment arbitration is more likely to run between $3,000 and 
$14,000.182 Moreover, the price of arbitration is getting cheaper for 
all employees as employers either voluntarily pay, or are required 
to pay, all or part of the costs of arbitration.183 Such savings, in 
turn, leads to greater accessibility for aggrieved parties. 
In terms of efficiency, statistics make clear that arbitration is 
more effective than litigation. For example, one recent study re­
vealed that the average arbitration is disposed of within twelve 
months.184 This contrasts sharply with the two and a half years it 
typically takes a workplace related dispute to be disposed of at the 
180. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EM­
PLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'y J. 189,209-210 (1997). See also Maltby, supra note 170, at 
49. Bingham's second empirical study based on a sample of cases decided in 1992 under 
the Commercial Rules, and in 1993 under the American Arbitration Association's 
(AAA) Employment Dispute Resolution Rules governing employment dispute cases, 
uncovered no statistically significant differences in the outcomes of employment dispute 
cases decided before and after the AAA's adoption of the new Employment Rules. 
Bingham, supra note 180, at 209-210. Although much of Bingham's research tends to 
support the notion that arbitration is not biased toward employers, she seems to be on a 
quest to validly assert such a claim. Id. Some scholars believe that, despite her articula­
tion and proposed support for a "repeat player" bias in favor of employers in arbitra­
tion, she has yet been able to prove that hypothesis. See Hill, supra note 174. 
181. Eisenberg & Clermont, supra note 175. See also Maltby, supra note 170, at 
49 (though the litigation statistics are not recent). 
182. Curtis Brown, Is Contractual Arbitration Fair?: What Courts, Case Outcomes 
and Public Perception Show About How Arbitration Compares to the Litigation System, 
at www.arb-forum.com/articleslhtmllbrown-01.asp (last visited Apr. 25, 2004) (compar­
ing the price articulated in Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 
1999) with the average costs of arbitration articulated by Maltby, supra note 170, at 54­
55). 
183. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'I Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483-85 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). 
184. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 29, at 403-04 (analyzing data compiled by the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service). 
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trial stage,185 and the one and a half years or more it takes a case to 
be resolved pre-trial by settlement or motion.186 With an exper­
ienced, neutral fact-finder, well versed in applicable law, the parties 
will quickly adduce only that evidence most relevant and material 
to the claim. There will be no need to use witnesses to educate and 
cajole and manipulate jury's feelings and attitudes. Time required 
by pre-trial motions, jury selection, jury needs, side-bar and in­
chamber conferences, researching and preparing jury instructions, 
and post jury award motions is eliminated with arbitration, resulting 
in decreased legal costs for the parties, and a great reduction in the 
burden on the court system.187 
Further benefits result from expediting the resolution of work­
place disputes through arbitration. Because employers must carry 
the contingent liability on their financial records after a claim has 
been asserted, the sooner the claim is resolved the better off they 
will be. Because the period of uncertainty often induces stress that 
engulfs employee claimants and hangs over organizations and their 
management personnel, expediting the resolution process benefits 
them as well. 
Although there are no statistics on the issue, it is important to 
address one of the many aspects of arbitration that both employers 
and employees have announced as advantageous - privacy. Of con­
cern to employees, individual managers, and their employing orga­
nizations, is the publicity which often accompanies the filing of a 
court complaint, particularly against a high profile local company or 
institution.188 A court action is public. All the allegations of an 
aggrieved employee, even if subsequently proven untrue, are public 
records. This not only adversely affects innocent businesses, but 
can also negatively affect the employee who, because of publicity, 
may become less employable.189 Anxiety and embarrassment often 
185. Id. Moreover, whereas arbitration is final and binding, litigation often in­
volves an even lengthier appeal process. See also Eisenberg & Clermont, supra note 
163. 
186. Befort, supra note 29, at 403-04 (noting that at the pre-trial stage lower win 
rates exists for plaintiffs). 
187. A recent study revealed that although a significant amount of the federal 
court docket is comprised of discrimination and civil rights complaints, only 118 of all 
federal cases now go to trial. Adam Liptak, U.S. Suits Multiply, But Fewer Ever Get to 
Trial, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec 14. 2003, at Al. 
188. Eric J. Conn, Note, Hanging in the Balance: Confidentiality Clauses and Post­
Judgment Settlements of Employment Discrimination Disputes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1537, 
1540 n.14 (2000) ("[T]he negative publicity surrounding charges of discriminatory prac­
tices can devastate a business and its market reputation.") (citation omitted). 
189. See Debra S. Katz et aI., Damages Issues in Employment Discrimination 
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affect non-parties, including family members of named individuals 
or potential witnesses.19o 
In contrast, arbitration is private and confidential.191 Newspa­
per reporters, bystanders, or individuals with their own agendas 
and/or indifferent to the stress or embarrassment that they may 
cause to individuals, are not present in arbitral proceedings.192 Per­
sons not a party to a claim, but who, because of aspects of their 
employment, may be witnesses or possess pertinent information, 
are spared the distress of feeling caught-in-the-middle between co­
worker and manager by the private nature of arbitration. This as­
pect of arbitration has been recognized as advancing the substan­
tive rights of each party while also providing a cathartic atmosphere 
by minimizing the "me-against-you" relationship with the employ­
ing organization.193 
In sum, the statistics comport with the Supreme Court's view 
that arbitration provides a fair, less costly, and efficient forum for 
addressing workplace disputes. The present litigation system does 
not work for many parties. Employees with valid legal claims that 
do not involve an economic loss of the extent that accompanies a 
discharge (e.g. a transfer in violation of Title VII) will not have suf­
fered the damages needed to attract a lawyer working on a contin­
gency fee. With the exception of very highly compensated 
employees, individuals will not usually have the economic ability to 
hire a lawyer.194 From the employer's perspective, jury awards are 
Cases: Hedonic Damages, Compensating Wage Differentials, Career Scarring Damages, 
and Career Diversion Damages, AL.I.-AB.A. 559, 567 (1998). 
[T]he concept of "career scarring" ... refer[s] to the loss of employment op­
portunities and impaired earning capacity that arises when a worker carries a 
"blot" on his/her employment record that discourages potential employers 
from considering the worker for employment or reduces employers' estimates 
of that employee's competence or attractiveness. Employers may avoid or de­
value workers whose careers are scarred, whether or not the worker's reputa­
tion as a non-performer or troublemaker is "deserved." 
Id. 
190. See Olson, supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text. 
191. John H. Henn, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 34, 38 (2004) ("[I]n general, arbitration 
offers considerable privacy, whereas litigation offers much less.") 
192. Of course, "[p]arties and witnesses can ... leak information to the press." Id. 
193. See, e.g., Jennifer A Marler, Note, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination 
Claims: The Lower Courts Extend Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane to Include Individ­
ual Employment Contracts, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 443, 474 (1996) (noting that "[p]arties 
settle disputes in a less antagonistic and more private forum"). 
194. Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making Of The Model Employment Termina­
tion Act, 69 WASH. L. REv. 361, 364 (1994). 
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often unrelated to the damages experienced by the individual. 195 
This systematic ineffectiveness leaves many parties frustrated and 
causes a lack of confidence in the present process to satisfactorily 
resolve their dispute. Indeed, statistics now reveal an overwhelm­
ing majority of Americans now favor arbitration, especially when 
they are informed of the cost compared to litigation. 196 Arbitration 
is different from court litigation, and as statistics and public senti­
ment suggest, it does not deserve the second-class status that its 
critics often infer.197 In the employment context, at least, arbitra­
tion has proven itself repeatedly to be the superior method of 
resolving workplace disputes. 
III. COUNTERING THE CRITICS 
Even though the available research shows that arbitration is a 
more effective means for resolving workplace related disputes, pre­
dispute arbitration agreements continue to have a fair share of crit­
ics.198 Arbitration is often cast by its opponents as an inferior sys­
tem of justice. Given the acceptance of arbitration as an alternative 
to court litigation in a wide range of disputes, unilateral criticism of 
it as inferior is difficult to support. However, objection is raised to 
the compulsory aspect of many employers' dispute resolution sys­
tems on two broad grounds: (1) arbitration is inherently biased in 
favor of employers,199 and (2) arbitration is a deterrent to the vindi­
cation of employee rights via statutory protections.2°o The argu­
ment that arbitration is inherently unfair rests on the grounds that 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the employment context are 
195. John W. R. Murray, The Uncertain Legacy of Gilmer: Federal Employment 
Discrimination Claims, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.l. 281, 298 (1999) ("A chief benefit of 
arbitration to employers is the protection it provides from inconsistent liability in the 
form of large, emotion-influenced jury awards and settlements."). 
196. See Brown, supra note 182 ("In one recent study, 90% of participants in 
arbitration believed their cases were handled fairly. In another study ... 59% of Amer­
icans would automatically choose arbitration over litigation, a number that jumped to 
83% in favor of arbitration when informed of the relative costs."). 
197. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: 
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. 
L. REV. 33 (criticizing the Supreme Court's support of arbitration). 
198. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against 
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 
64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996); Schwartz, supra note 197, at 37; Jean R. Sternlight, 
Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding 
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996). 
199. See Schwartz, supra note 197, at 63. 
200. See Kathryn V. W. Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment 
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996). 
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unconscionable contracts of adhesion, that the process is suscepti­
ble on many points to unfairness, or that employment should not be 
premised on a waiver of a person's right to a jury trial. It is also 
claimed that mandatory arbitration weakens the Civil Rights Act 
and other anti-discrimination statutes. Criticism based on the no­
tion that arbitration deters the vindication of employee statutory 
rights rests on several premises, including the notion that both the 
costs of arbitration act as a deterrent and that the deterrent effect 
of anti-discrimination statutes flowing from the threat of large jury 
awards is lost in arbitration. This section considers such criticisms 
of employment arbitration in turn. 
A. Arbitration is Not Inherently Biased Towards Employers 
1. Unconscionable Contracts of Adhesion 
Critics of pre-dispute arbitration agreements to resolve em­
ployment based claims often argue that these contracts are uncon­
scionable contracts of adhesion and should not be enforced because 
of the inherent unequal bargaining power between a potential em­
ployer and an employee.201 While the Supreme Court has never 
taken such a view of pre-employment agreements,202 the criticism 
still exists and courts continue to invalidate arbitration agreements 
on these grounds.203 
Criticism based on the adhesive nature of these alternative dis­
pute procedures emphasizes the imbalance in power between an 
employer and an applicant.204 Basically, these critics argue that re­
quiring agreement on arbitration as the forum for legal claims ac­
companied by a waiver of jury trials as a condition of being hired 
201. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 197, at 69; Stone, supra note 200, at 1037. 
202. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). For a full 
discussion of Circuit City see supra Part I.C.2. See also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 
534 U.S. 279 (2002). 
203. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002). On 
remand from the Supreme Court, the court held that the agreement was procedurally 
unconscionable because it was a contract of adhesion; a standard-form contract, drafted 
by the party with superior bargaining power, which relegates to the other party the 
option of either adhering to its terms without modification or rejecting the contract 
entirely. Id. at 893. See also Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 
2002) (finding arbitration agreement unconscionable), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 1169 
(2004); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003), cerr. denied, 
124 S. Ct. 1169 (2004). But see Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 
1999) (finding, in a sexual harassment case, that a particular dispute resolution process 
was too biased and one-sided to be called arbitration or enforced by the court). 
204. See Stone, supra note 200, at 1036-44. 
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tramples on an individual's rights.205 It is argued that the applicant 
has no choice.206 
Although this outcry has a certain appeal, especially for those 
who are cynical about business, under current standards of contract 
law a perceived, or even inherent, inequality in the bargaining con­
text does not create a basis for voiding an agreement that is entered 
into knowingly by the parties.207 This reality is illustrated by the 
following, very ordinary, examples. Everyday, the poor consumer 
enters the one local supermarket, operated by a multi-billion dollar 
international corporation and is given the choice of paying the su­
permarket's price and eating, or walking away hungry. Similarly, 
any person desiring to take the subway will be turned away if he/she 
does not have correct fare. Although obvious take-it-or-Ieave-it 
propositions, contract law does not invalidate these arrangements ­
by returning the price of subway fare or returning the price of a 
piece of fruit - on the basis that they are unconscionable or that the 
"prices" are caused by unequal bargaining power.208 
To be sure, compulsory employment arbitration systems used 
as alternatives to court litigation are usually the result of one party 
(management) controlling the design of the system. Critics main­
tain that the opportunity to design the system gives the designer an 
unfair advantage, allowing management to reduce the remedies 
available and damages that they would be required to pay in litiga­
tion.209 In accord with this argument, critics maintain that this un­
fair advantage should void these contracts on the basis of 
unconscionability.210 
Some of the early mandatory arbitration programs may have 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Although state laws differ on principles of contract law, the general rule is 
that absent "fraud, mistake or unfair dealing" a contract will be enforced. Moreover, 
the United States Supreme Court made clear in Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 
U.S. 681, 687 (1996), that States are precluded from singling out arbitration clauses for 
unfavorable treatment from other types of contracts. 
208. See Alexander v. Anthony Int'!, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 264, 269 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(noting that arbitration agreements have been denied enforcement in Title VII and 
ADEA claim on the doctrine of unconscionability). Unconscionability must involve 
both the procedure in reaching agreement to arbitrate and the substance of that agree­
ment. The take-it-or-leave-it accompanied by unequal bargaining power only goes to 
the procedure question and is an insufficient basis upon which to deny enforcement. 
For such an agreement to fail, the substantive provisions would have to be extremely 
one-sided and unfair, so as to "shock the conscience." Id. at 265-66. See also Adams, 
279 F.3d at 893. 
209. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 200, at 1017. 
210. Id. 
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been susceptible to this criticism. There is evidence that many early 
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate in the employment context 
were crafted in a way that made the mutuality of obligation illu­
sory.211 Moreover, there is evidence that some early pre-dispute 
agreements to arbitrate pushed the envelope by attempting to con­
tract away remedies available in litigation.212 Presently, however, 
with the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration for employment 
issues having been upheld by the Supreme Court, and with the 
availability of arbitration due process protocols adopted by the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA),213 the Judicial Arbitra­
tion and Mediation Services (JAMS),214 and the federal court deci­
sions involving their content,215 there should be little validity to this 
criticism except as specifically limited to the very few systems which 
stray from such boundaries.216 Moreover, the standards required 
by the proposal in Part IV of this Article would overcome any con­
cerns that pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the employment 
context could be created to the unilateral benefit of only one party 
- the designer. 
211. See, e.g., Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d l38 (1997). The court 
found unconscionable an arbitration clause that reserved litigation rights to the em­
ployer only; denied employees rights to exemplary damages, equitable relief, attorney 
fees, and costs; and imposed a shorter statute of limitations. By only limiting the availa­
ble forums to bring the suit to the employee, the provision lacked mutuality of obliga­
tion. [d. at 150-51. 
212. See, e.g., id.; Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D. S.c. 
1998) (one-sided arbitration agreement that takes away numerous substantive rights 
and remedies of employee under Title VII unenforceable as unconscionable and void 
on public policy grounds). 
2l3. American Arbitration Assoc., A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and 
Arbitration ofStatutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, available 
at http://www.adr.orglindex2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15769&JSPsrc=uploaALIVESITE\Rules_ 
Procedures\Protocols\..\..\focusArea\employment\protocol.html (May 9, 1995). 
214. JAMS, JAMS Policy on Employment Arbitration Minimum Standards of 
Procedural Fairness, available at http://www.jamsadr.com/employment_Arbitration_ 
min_stds-2003.asp (last visited Aug. 21, 2004). 
215. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns, 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997). (Cole stands 
for proposition that an arbitration arrangement which 
(1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discov­
ery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that 
would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees to 
pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condi­
tion of access to the arbitration forum 
meets minimum due process requirements. [d. 
216. For example, those arbitration agreements that fail to abide by the due pro­
cess protocol. 
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2. Weaken Statutory Rights of Employees 
Critics of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements also 
claim these contracts are biased because they weaken statutory 
rights through a private enforcement mechanism.217 However, the 
reality is that statutes prohibiting discriminatory workplace conduct 
are not weakened by private dispute resolution systems. Arbitra­
tion agreements are between employer and employee, and these 
agreements do not restrain the EEOC or any other government 
agency from their missions.218 Further, data demonstrates all too 
clearly both: (1) the improbability that the EEOC will pursue a 
court claim on behalf of an individual employee, and (2) the diffi­
culty that a low waged individual with minimal economic damages 
has in instituting court litigation.219 Because of the enhanced access 
to fairly resolving a meritorious claim, one can persuasively argue 
that the policing of discrimination laws is enhanced through com­
pulsory arbitration.220 
Despite the Supreme Court's mandate that a valid arbitration 
agreement cannot abrogate the remedies provided under a statu­
tory scheme,221 critics of pre-dispute arbitration agreements con­
tinue to maintain that the remedies awarded by arbitration are not 
the same that are available in court litigation. However, the fact 
that arbitration awards may more closely mirror the losses incurred 
rather than state lottery pay outs222 is not a valid criticism of arbi­
tration, but rather points to a flaw in the litigation system.223 With 
a full remedy for any damages incurred because of a violation of 
217. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 197, at 58-60. 
218. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291 (2002). 
219. The reality is that only a minority of EEOC charges ever end up in court. 
Statutory claims that do result in litigation are typically resolved in private settlement, 
dismissal, or some other dispositive motion by the courts. See, e.g., David Sherwyn, 
Because it Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail to Fix 
the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 23 (2003) (claiming that 75% of discrimination cases 
filed result in no public response). 
220. Id. at 24. 
221. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 279; Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 
105 (2001). 
222. Befort, supra note 29, at 402 ("What we have, in effect, is a uniquely Ameri­
can employment law lottery."); Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About 
Their Rights, and Why Does it Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6,18 (2002) ("The indirect 
legal enforcement of norms of fairness-even if that is a fair description of the system 
we have-cannot work for whole groups of employees who cannot afford a ticket in the 
litigation lottery."). 
223. This criticism comes largely from the plaintiffs bar which is more interested 
in pursuing profit than workplace justice, as evidenced by retainer agreements required 
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prohibited discrimination laws required in employment arbitration 
agreements, the civil rights law will not, and cannot, be weakened. 
Much of the advocating for arbitration on the part of employ­
ers results from verdicts that have been pursued before sympa­
thetic-to-employee and hostile-to-employer juries in proceedings 
that have become known as "workplace lotteries."224 Ironically, 
such verdicts weaken civil rights laws by creating contempt for the 
system. Instead of pursuing the lofty principals of workplace dig­
nity and respect that are at the core of these statutes, disputants 
employ techniques of liability avoidance or manipulation of the in­
tended protections. 
3. Violates the Right to a Jury Trial 
Condemnation of a waiver of a jury trial is also one of the com­
mon rallying points for many opponents of compulsory arbitra­
tion.225 In their view, pre-dispute agreements which waive either 
party's right to a jury trial violate the Seventh Amendment since 
such waivers are rarely "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent."226 
before the average plaintiff's attorney will take the case. See ADR Vision Roundtable: 
Challenges for the 21st Century, 56 DISP. RESOL. J. 8, 13 (2001). 
Employers, in their self-interest to avoid jury trials are creating a new system 
for dispute resolution that is, I think, to the benefit of most workers, because 
up front, ex-ante, pre-dispute, you have to offer this plan to large groups of 
employees. You don't know who's going to have a claim, and so you're creat­
ing a more accessible system for average claimants at the expense of those few 
who could get into the litigation lottery. I call this "Saturns for rickshaws." 
Id. (quoting Professor Sam Eistreicher of the New York University School of Law). 
224. See, e.g., id. See also David Sherwyn, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration 
of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Construct­
ing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 80 (1999) (noting "plain­
tiffs and their attorneys may turn down what had once been full relief in the hopes of 
winning the employment discrimination lottery-an exorbitant jury award") (emphasis 
added). 
225. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitra­
tion as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, July 19, 2003, available at http:// 
www.roscoepound.org/new/updates/sternlight.pdf (last visited at Aug. 21, 2004). Courts 
have ruled that waiver of a right to a jury trial is not a bar to a compulsory arbitration. 
EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2003); De­
siderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198,205 (2nd Cir. 1999); Rosenberg 
v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1999). 
226. Sternlight, supra note 225, at 6. 
To determine whether a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver has been 
made, federal courts look at such factors as the negotiability of the waiver, the 
conspicuousness of the waiver, the degree of bargaining power disparity be­
tween the parties, and the degree of professional or business sophistication on 
the part of the party opposing the waiver. Courts often place the burden of 
proof on those parties who assert that the jury trial right has been waived. 
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However, two points are lost in this rhetoric. First, this argument 
assumes that mandatory pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate will 
not consist of a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver on the 
part of employees. Second, this criticism ignores the objective of 
workplace justice. The reality is that most of the substantive pro­
tections afforded employees are statutory and were not available at 
common law, and are therefore outside the scope of protection pro­
vided by the Seventh Amendment. 
Most anti-discrimination statutes have at their core a two-fold 
purpose: (1) mandating equal treatment of the workplace, and (2) 
rectifying the past inequalities of discrimination.227 To achieve this 
end, anti-discrimination laws attempt to provide a mechanism for 
equably restoring the victims of unequal treatment in the workplace 
and economically punishing those employers that intentionally vio­
late the law.228 This can be achieved through many enforcement 
mechanisms, not just jury triaL In fact, Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act functioned for many years without a provision for a jury 
triaJ.229 
Quite simply, utilizing arbitration in place of court litigation or 
an administrative agency tribunal is not unique and does not sub­
vert enforcement of employment laws or the employee's right to a 
jury triaJ.230 The NLRB regularly defers issues involving violations 
of the National Labor Relations Act to pre-dispute arbitration fo­
rums incorporated in labor agreements.231 State fair employment 
Id. 
227. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) 
(explaining the purpose of Title VII and the ADEA). 
228. However, even if punitive damages are available they usually come with a 
cap. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act tit. VII, 42 U.S.c. §2000e (2004) (providing a $300,000 
cap on compulsory and punitive damages). 
229. For twenty-seven years Title VII did not provide a right of jury trial and Title 
VII decisions were bench decisions issued by a solitary judge after trial. In 1991, Con­
gress again amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the Compensatory 
Damages Amendment, permitting, among other issues, victims of intentional discrimi­
nation to recover compensatory damages "[i]n an action ... under [§ 2000e-16)." 
§ 1981a(a)(1). Moreover, it adds that any party in such an action may demand a jury 
trial. § 1981a(c). 
230. In fact, in light of EEOCv. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2004), the 
Department of Labor has issued a statement about when the solicitor should defer to 
the results of an arbitration agreement. See United States Dep't of Labor, Memoran­
dum for Regional Solicitors Associate Solicitors, available at http://www.dol.gov/soUme­
dialmemos/August9.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2004). 
231. Id. The NLRB has long utilized a deferral process encapsulated in the Col­
lyer and Spielberg doctrines. Under the Collyer doctrine, deferral to arbitration is 
granted pending the outcome of the arbitration itself. Under the Spielberg doctrine, the 
NLRB defers to arbitral awards that already have been rendered and have resolved 
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practice agencies that have deferral agreements with the EEOC 
honor arbitration of equal employment and Title VII claims in lieu 
of proceedings by the agency.232 Even claims for discriminatory 
employment action under OSHA are subject to deferral to arbitra­
tion in appropriate circumstances.233 
4. Repeat Player Effect 
Critics also argue that the repeat usage of an arbitrator may 
affect the arbitrator's neutrality, injecting a bias into the proceed­
ings.234 Critics label this the "Repeat Player" effect. In the critics 
view, employers are at a distinct advantage in arbitration having 
been in the arbitration game more than once.235 However, this the­
ory does not appear to withstand scrutiny. For example, in an em­
pirical study, Elizabeth Hill of AAA employment cases found no 
support for the theory.236 Rather than a lack of due process, she 
found that "repeat player" employers were merely learning to be 
better employers through the arbitration process.237 In her view, 
the "repeat player" employer was more likely to recognize and dis-
issues of facts in a way that is determinative of the pending NLRB charge. See generally 
The Developing Labor Law: The Board, the Courts, and The National Labor Relations 
Act, in 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1376 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 4th ed. 2002). 
232. Section 706(c) provides that where an alleged discriminatory employment 
practice has occurred in a so-called "deferral state" (a state that has its own anti-dis­
crimination laws and enforcement agency), the deferral state has sixty days of exclusive 
jurisdiction over the claim, and only after the sixty days have expired or the proceedings 
have been "earlier terminated" can the charge be filed with the EEOC. 42 U.S.c. 
§ 2000e-5(c) (2004). However, states are free under the act to waive this sixty day pe­
riod under a work-share agreement with the EEOC. Id. 
233. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. Citing 29 C.F.R. § 1977 (2000), 
which provides that 
[a] determination to defer to the outcome of other proceedings initiated by a 
complainant must necessarily be made on a case-to-case basis, after careful 
scrutiny of all available information. Before deferring to the results of other 
proceedings, it must be clear that those proceedings dealt adequately with all 
factual issues, that the proceedings were fair, regular, and free of procedural 
infirmities, and that the outcome of the proceedings was not repugnant to the 
purpose and policy of the Act. In this regard, if such other actions initiated by 
a complainant are dismissed without adjudicatory hearing thereof, such dis­
missal will not ordinarily be regarded as determinative of the section l1(c) 
complaint. 
[d. 
234. See, e.g., Bigham, supra note 180, at 191-96. 
235. Id. at 190. The repeat player theory assumes that employers have greater 
familiarity with arbitration than employees because most employees do not deal with 
workplace related claims on a routine basis. 
236. See Hill, supra note 174, at 785-92. 
237. Id. 
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pose of meritorious employee claims through the employer's in­
house dispute resolution system after already having disputed simi­
lar claims, and thereafter leave only meritless and questionable 
cases for arbitration.238 The Hill study concluded that AAA pro­
ceedings offered substantially "affordable" due process to middle 
and lower income employees instead of the critics' claim that 
mandatory arbitration plans replaced an employee's right to a jury 
trial with a "kangaroo court" dominated by the employer.239 
B. 	 Even-handed Arbitration Agreements Do Not Deter Employee 
Access to Justice 
1. 	 Cost is a Deterrent to Access 
In addition to the legal arguments against the use of arbitra­
tion, critics also continue to maintain that arbitration should not be 
supported because the cost to the complainant of compulsory arbi­
tration plans deters access by employees. According to these crit­
ics, when a claim is taken to court, the taxpayer, and not the party, 
pays the expenses of the forum. Conversely, they argue that, when 
a claim is arbitrated provisions regarding costs - such as responsi­
bility for filing fees, the arbitrator's fee or hearing costs - can be 
designed by the employer to serve as a deterrent to the presenta­
tion of meritorious statutory claims.240 
Concerned with the "who pays" aspect of arbitration agree­
ments, the Supreme Court, in Green Tree Financial Corporation v. 
Larketta Randolph,241 addressed the issues of cost and accessibility 
in arbitration agreements involving the waiver of a jury trial for 
statutory claims. In that case, the Court ruled that a claim arising 
under a statute designed to further important social policy may be 
arbitrated because "so long as the prospective litigant effectively 
may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral 
forum" the statute serves its function.242 In challenging the agree­
ment to arbitrate, Randolph asserted that arbitration costs are high 
and that she did not have the resources to arbitrate.243 This, she 
238. 	 Id. at 816. 
239. 	 Id. at 815. See also supra text accompanying note 152. 
240. Sherwyn, supra note 224, at 15 n.74 (stating that "[c]ritics believe that 
mandatory arbitration is an unfair process that employers force onto employees which 
impedes the goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace"). 
241. 	 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
242. Id. at 90 (quoting Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985». 
243. 	 Id. at 89. 
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argued, amounted to being unable to vindicate her statutory 
rights.244 However, the Court found that the risk of an individual 
facing prohibitive costs was too speculative to invalidate the arbi­
tration agreement.245 
In the aftermath of Green Tree, few employers with internal 
dispute resolution plans will design the plans to give themselves an 
undue advantage because such practices could mandate an unneces­
sary trip to the courthouse. To address concerns about whether a 
fee-splitting agreement is permissible, most employers already util­
ize due process protocols similar to the AAA246 or those laid down 
by courts. Further, the plan recommended in Part IV contains ele­
ments that would alleviate such concerns. 
2. 	 Undermines Legal Compliance by Weakening the 
Deterrent Effect of Current Litigation 
Punitive damage awards by juries serve as the basis for many 
critiques that present litigation is the best policing process for en­
suring compliance with employment laws. The ability of a jury to 
impose large punitive damage awards is often cited; for example, in 
June 1995, a jury assessed punitive damages of $50,000,000 against 
Wal-Mart for an employee's claim that her supervisor sexually 
harassed her by commenting on her figure. 247 Nevertheless, it is 
doubtful whether excessive jury awards change conduct. Usually, 
they only lead to greater legal expenses for both employer and em­
ployee in post-trial motions or appeals, and such awards are fre­
quently reduced by the court.248 It is the threat of action, 
accompanied by a realistic appreciation of the possibility of an un­
desirable outcome that serves as a deterrent. This too can be a re­
sult of arbitration.249 
244. Id. at 91 n.6. 
245. Id. at 9l. 
246. See American Arbitration Association, available at http://www.adr.org (last 
visited Aug. 21, 2004). 
247. See Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 570 (8th Cir. 1997). The 
jury correctly found, and the appeals court agreed, that Peggy Zimzey was subjected to 
an irreproachable kind of harassment, including verbal abuse and inappropriate touch­
ing and that, although the plaintiff complained, management did not take any action. 
Id. However, on appeal the original punitive damages award was reduced to 
$2,000,000, or, alternatively subject to a new trial on damages. Id. at 579. 
248. /d. at 579. See also Ortiz-Del Valle v. Nat'! Basketball Ass'n, 42 F. Supp. 2d 
334, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
249. As stated before, arbitration must provide for the same remedies, including 
punitive damages, available under statutory laws protecting employees. However, al­
though this author believes such excessive awards are less common partly because a 
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Moreover, the deterrent effect of court litigation is probably 
overstated when actual claims experience is analyzed. Most poten­
tial respondents, if influenced by other parties' court experiences, 
are probably well aware that only certain cases obtain the high pro­
file awards that critics point to as a deterrent.25o As stated previ­
ously, one survey uncovered that only 5% of discrimination cases 
brought to plaintiffs' lawyers by prospective plaintiffs were ac­
cepted and pursued, and then only when there were provable dam­
ages of $60,000 to $65,000.251 If only a small number of actual cases 
are being heard, the present design of the litigation system under­
mines its own purported deterrent effect. Indeed, by opening the 
door to grievances which were previously denied access, arbitration, 
a process where employees enjoy a success rate of 64%,252 has the 
potential to provide a genuine deterrent not found in the litigation 
arena. 
C. Scope of Review 
Another area of concern propounded by critics is the scope of 
review of an arbitrator's award. If arbitration awards are final and 
binding then the usual scope of review, which is limited to arbitra­
tor misconduct or partiality, fraud, arbitrary or undue means,253 will 
good arbitrator will be knowledgeable both of employment law and workplace related 
issues, arbitrators have awarded excessive punitive damages. As in litigation, however, 
courts will not hesitate to bring such excessive awards in line with existing precedent. 
See, e.g., Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 2003 WL 288471, at *6-7 (N.Y. App. Div. 
Feb. 11,2003). Sawtelle involved a terminated broker who filed an arbitration with the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., (NASD) against his former employer 
alleging that the employer engaged in a smear campaign against him by sending threat­
ening letters to his clients, refusing to forward his mail and telephone calls, and improp­
erly preparing a Form U-5 to create an impression that Sawtelle was being investigated 
by the SEC. Id. In vacating a lower court's confirmation of an arbitration panel's award 
of $25,000,000 in punitive damages to Sawtelle, the First Department held that the 
award of punitive damages was "vastly out of proportion to the 'penalties that could be 
imposed for comparable misconduct'" in that it far exceeded "any NASD award in a 
broker termination dispute" and remanded to the arbitration panel for reconsideration 
the issue of punitive damages.) (citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 
559, 583 (1996». 
250. Sawtelle, 2003 WL 288471, at *6-7. 
251. See supra text accompanying note 174. 
252. See supra text accompanying note 179. 
253. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) 
(the FAA provides that where courts can overturn the arbitration award "where there 
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators."); United Paper Workers Int'l 
Union, 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) ("[D]ecisions procured by the parties through fraud or 
through the arbitrator's dishonesty need not be enforced."); Lucent Tech. Inc. v. Tatung 
Co., 379 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2004); New York Hospital Med. Ctr. of Queens v. 1199 Nat'l 
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not generally deal with errors of law. However, this criticism is eas­
ily dispelled under the proposed model for workplace justice. The 
suggested model will permit an appeal from an otherwise final de­
termination of an award if there is a prejudicial error of law.254 
A related criticism is that without written, reasoned awards, 
judicial review is limited and decisional accountability is eroded. 
Awards then become equity-based rather than premised on the law 
and on procedure, and private justice prevents the development of 
decisional law. The absence of written decisions introduces the pos­
sibility that an arbitrator's authority is restrained in what substan­
tive law could be considered by the arbitrator and by the burdens of 
proof that an arbitrator may employ. Such criticisms fall within the 
broader due process attack. Most employment cases involve the 
application of existing law and not the development of new deci­
sional law. Very few cases involve the creation of new case law. 
The administrative agencies are not prevented from being involved 
in the field or in attempting to expand the existing law directly in 
cases that they bring. Under the suggested model, if no law exists, 
then the arbitrator's decision will not have applied existing law. As 
such, that arbitrator's award dealing with the unusual circumstances 
of the dispute could be appealed and would result in establishing 
case law. However, these are arguments that have been dealt with 
successfully by the adoption of due process protocols. Ultimately, 
in the absence of specific systems that contain such shortcomings, 
these criticisms amount to straw arguments. 
D. The Reality 
The critics of arbitration correctly point out the dangers of an 
arbitration system left unchecked by the protocols of due process 
and contract law; a system designed by one party is susceptible to 
being bent in favor of that party if certain guarantees are not met. 
However, as demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, this "due 
process" basis for a broad attack upon the concept of arbitration is 
lynch-pinned by facets of court litigation which provide for less ac­
cess and greater unfairness for the majority of employees. Moreo-
Health and Human Servo Employees, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 31323 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Holcomb v. Colony Bay Coal Co., 852 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1988) (as long as arbitrator is 
even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his 
authority, only decisions procured by fraud or the arbitrator's dishonesty need not be 
enforced). 
254. See Sternlight, supra note 225 (providing an explanation of the Model Em­
ployment Termination Act, which is the same standard suggested here). 
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ver, overreaching in the design of a dispute resolution system will 
result in futility. Due process protocols that should be a model for 
arbitration programs exist. Successful compulsory programs pro­
vide a different forum, but possess the same substantive rights and 
necessary elements of due process as litigation in court. The bene­
fits achieved by the employer with arbitration, which could be lost 
by stacking the deck in its favor, eliminates any incentive to over­
reach. The suggested dispute resolution system discussed below not 
only requires an acceptable level of due process, but also ensures 
levels of consistency and predictability currently absent in decisions 
being hashed out by courts.255 
E. Employers Join the Critics 
Before this section concludes, it is important to note that em­
ployers are among the critics. Unlike those who claim that a deter­
rent to wrongful practices is lost with mandatory arbitration 
programs, these employers worry that the existence of a compul­
sory employment dispute resolution plan only encourages disputes 
that might not otherwise be advanced.256 However, arbitration 
deals only with disputes that could be brought in court or be pur­
sued at a government agency. These disputes exist. Arbitration 
does not create disputes. At best, this criticism deals with existing 
disputes which an employee has not presented and thus are un­
resolved; disputes that employer-critics wrongly assume are better 
left unresolved. 
Unresolved disputes have an adverse impact on productivity 
and efficiency.257 Often a "get-even" mentality develops when a 
matter cannot be easily and simply resolved internally and that dis­
position drives complainants to outside government agencies. Pub­
lic and community relations suffer as a result of the inevitable 
negative comments of disgruntled employees or their families. 
Thus, mandatory arbitration does not create disputes, but rather 
255. See supra notes 222 and 224 describing employment-related litigation as a 
"lottery. " 
256. See generally Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advan­
tage From Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 
399 (2000) (providing an elaborate discussion critiquing the purported benefits of arbi­
tration to employers). 
257. See generally, David Lewin and Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Systems of Employee 
Voice: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, CAL. MGMT. REV., Spring 1992, at 95-111 
(Studies found lower numbers of grievances in production facilities correlated to higher 
rates of productivity and that higher grievance rates correlate with low productivity and 
higher production costs.). 
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provides a method of airing and resolving existing disputes in the 
most cost effective and least disruptive manner. It gives employers 
a no-cost or a relatively low-cost process of nipping the gripe in the 
bud before it grows into a more complicated and egregious contro­
versy that could take the employer and the employee into court­
room or government agency litigation. 




As the preceding sections make clear, arbitration has evolved 
to the point where it is not only enforceable, efficient and fair, but 
is favored by the courts and, when designed correctly, works to pro­
mote workplace efficiency, harmony and evenhandedness in a way 
that litigation, almost unilaterally, has failed to achieve. This next 
section addresses the envisioned future of arbitration in the em­
ployment context, arguing that the present debate over the features 
of a valid contract should be forsaken in favor of the features of a 
statutory scheme that not only mandates the arbitration of work­
place disputes, but specifies what such agreements require. To 
achieve its purpose, this section does two things. First, it lays out 
the reasons why a new arbitration scheme is needed. Second, al­
though this Article does not address the exact form such a model 
would take, it does highlight elements this author feels are essential 
to a system of workplace justice - elements that ensure that arbitra­
tion meets the challenges posed by its critics to produce a fair sys­
tem to solve workplace disputes. 
A. Why We Need a Statutory Scheme 
Earlier, this Article illustrated some of the major problems 
with the current litigation model, including cost, inefficiency, and 
inaccessibility.258 However, the issue of inefficiency deserves fur­
ther development. At present, the law of the workplace includes 
many grounds for claims, both by the employee and the employer, 
and many forums for resolution.259 It is common for an aggrieved 
employee to file charges against an employer based on federal and 
state statutory law, as well as common law, for alleged injuries suf­
fered as a result of one episode.260 Depending on the nature of 
258. See supra Part II. 
259. See Befort, supra note 29, at 397-403 (concurring with the views expressed in 
this section). 
260. See, e.g., Harper v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 134 F.Supp. 2d 470, 472 (D. 
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these claims, there could be multiple forums that have jurisdiction. 
This issue of multiple jurisdiction and forum selection has drastic 
results. For example, duplication of forums has resulted in motions 
for removal;261 deferral by one compliance agency to another;262 
deferral by an administrative agency to labor contract arbitra­
tion;263 remands by a court to arbitration;264 and proceedings in 
multiple forums.265 This often complicates proceedings as a party 
Conn. 2001) (action for damages and equitable relief alleging wrongful denial of pro­
motion in employment based on race and/or gender, wrongful termination of employ­
ment based on race and/or gender, other incidents of disparate treatment, retaliation 
and post-employment retaliation pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.c. §§ 1981 and 1983, and 
violations of common law precepts concerning defamation, false light invasion of pri­
vacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Urey v. Grove City College, 94 
Fed. Appx. 79 (3d Cir. 2004) (former housekeeper filed suit against the employer, alleg­
ing claims of retaliation under various state and federal statutory provisions and the 
Pennsylvania common law). 
261. For example, it is not uncommon for a case which has already been removed 
to federal court, to be remanded to state court once the federal claim is dismissed. For 
a solid example see Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandleless, 50 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995) 
holding that district courts have discretion to remand to state court a removed case 
involving pendent claims upon a proper determination that retaining jurisdiction over 
the case would be inappropriate because of concerns over economy, convenience, fair­
ness, and comity. The irony is that the nature of this process prolongs litigation. 
262. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-5 (for claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 the 300-day filing period applies in states where the EEOC defers to the en­
forcement efforts of a state agency empowered to undertake employment discrimina­
tion investigations). 
263. For example, the NLRB routinely allows the arbitration process to substitute 
for its own administrative processes in unfair labor practice cases even though the 
agency does not have the power to enforce arbitration agreements or enforce arbitra­
tors' awards. Thus, if a collective agreement contains an arbitration clause, then the 
NLRB usually will decline to exercise jurisdiction over an unfair labor practices charge 
and await the outcome of the arbitration. Following the arbitration, the NLRB typi­
cally dismisses the unfair labor practice charge. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 
837 (1971); Spielberg Manufacturing Company, 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). 
264. See Befort, supra note 29, at 397-403 and accompanying notes. 
265. See Befort, supra note 29, at 398 "[The employment law] maze is further 
complicated by the possibility of multiple forums. Discharge-related claims potentially 
may be heard by a federal court, state court, administrative agency, or an arbitrator." 
For example, in Massachusetts most cases where an employee is terminated and be­
lieves it is because of unlawful discrimination result in the aggrieved individual's filing 
of an unemployment claim, an unemployment investigation and an unemployment ap­
peal before a discrimination claim is ever filed with the Massachusetts Commission 
Against Discrimination (MCAD). In fact, in the typical scenario the unemployment 
process is completed before a discrimination complaint is ever filed. This is also true in 
the case of worker's compensation claims, which often involve the same facts that give 
rise to an allegation of disability discrimination pursuant to the ADA. Under existing 
models of workplace justice, there is no mechanism for ensuring that the multiple juris­
dictions which adjudicate the various claims arising from the same event will ultimately 
be making decisions on the same set of facts. Not only does this result in the inefficient 
duplication of the fact-finding process, but it also defies logic - under the current sys­
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may attempt to avoid a finding of fact that will affect a companion 
proceeding in another forum.266 For similar reasons, it complicates 
attempts at settling a dispute. The present setting for obtaining 
workplace justice can be needlessly overburdening and complex for 
both employee and employer. A single set of employment related 
facts giving rise to mUltiple claims implicating multiple forums cre­
ates judicial inefficiency, unnecessary public expense, and needless 
legal expense for the parties. And, despite the mUltiple procedural 
forums, a claim must substantively fit within the jurisdiction of a 
particular forum in order to be viable. 
This consequence of 21st century employment dispute litiga­
tion has to be confronted and dealt with head on. The inefficiency, 
confusion, and costs of maintaining the present litigation system are 
harmful to the economy and fails workplace justice. Quite simply, 
the American economy and the workplace require a different and 
better process for resolving disputes that eliminates unnecessary 
costs, enhances worker productivity, provides access to resolve 
workplace related disputes in a manner consistent with existing 
laws, and spares taxpayers without the loss of substantive work­
place protections. Each of these requirements can be achieved by 
Congress enacting a comprehensive procedural statute governing 
the resolution of workplace based claims and disputes. Such a pro­
posed model is outlined below. 
B. The Form of the Future Model for Workplace Justice 
Over the past decade, both the courts and employers have had 
experience with the development of dispute resolution programs 
utilizing arbitration. Hundreds of employers have installed 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration resolution programs, which have 
produced beneficial results for employees and employers, while 
saving society and participants unnecessary costS.267 Moreover, as 
tern it is all too often the case that an employee's grievance from the same exact event 
will have different outcomes because multiple fact·finders interpreted the same set of 
events. 
266. Id. 
267. Stephan W. Skrainka, Essay: The Utility of Arbitration Agreements in Em­
ployment Manuals and Collective Bargaining Agreements for Resolving Civil Rights, 
Age and ADA Claims, 37 ST. LOUIS L.J. 985, 991 (1993). 
Arbitration ... has lower legal fees, involves less time, and presents less of a 
chance that an employer will incur large consequential and punitive damages. 
Because the decisions come sooner and with less appellate scrutiny, it is more 
likely that reinstatement, outplacement, or other kinds of imaginative reme­
dies will be crafted in the course of arbitration than in the context of a court 
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demonstrated in the preceding sections, arbitration has proven it­
self to be not only an alternative to court litigation, but a forum for 
workplace dispute resolution that comports with the goals of work­
place justice. It is time for Congress to enact a comprehensive stat­
ute that requires mandatory arbitration of employment related 
disputes between employees and employers engaged in interstate 
commerce. Such a system should not tamper with existing substan­
tive laws, but rather, provide a unified and procedurally consistent 
method of resolving workplace claims. 
1. 	 What Mandatory Arbitration Means: The Public Policy 
Behind the Proposed Model 
Although one of the major reasons for the proposed model is 
the unification of procedure for resolving workplace disputes to 
benefit employees and employers in terms of cost, access to justice, 
and quick resolution,268 a shift to federally mandatory arbitration of 
all employment related disputes would be a significant positive 
change for the public good. That is, the proposed model would 
benefit society, government, and the federal and state judicial sys­
tems. Taxpayers today spend enormous sums maintaining a work­
place regulatory process, numerous employment related agency 
tribunals,269 and courts to deal with workplace issues.27o As stated 
previously, approximately 8%-10% of the federal courts' caseload 
consists of workplace issues.271 In those states considered by the 
decision, especially a jury trial. By the time a case goes to a jury, it is usually 
four or five years old. At that point the issues will include backpay and 
frontpay, and the parties will be too angry to consider reinstatement. We have 
to think about the social costs of those factors. We must also consider the costs 
both to the employer, and to the employee, whose life is an open question 
while the litigation is pending. 
Id. 
268. See supra Part II. 
269. The White House, for example, has allocated $351,000,000 from the 2005 
Budget for the EEOC. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States 
Government, Fiscal Year 2005, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omblbudget/ 
fy2005/agencies.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2004). 
270. Although exact figures are not available on how much of the federal judici­
ary's budget gets allocated to resolving workplace related claims, it is clear that at least 
10% of the federal court docket consists of workplace related controversies and that the 
federal judiciary's budget is in a state of crisis. See Judiciary Fiscal Year 2004 Budget 
Facts and Figures, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judiciary2003lbudgetfacts.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2004). Although the Federal Judiciary in 2003 reported that it 
would need a 7.3% budget increase just to maintain current services, Congress ulti­
mately settled on only a 4.3% increase for the fiscal year 2004. Id. 
271. According to data, civil rights cases involving employment disputes made up 
over 10% of the federal courts of appeals docket. Furthermore, 8% of the cases com­
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plaintiff's bar as having greater employee-friendly statutes or deci­
sionallaw, the percentage of state court lawsuits involving employ­
ment related issues is surely as high. The cost-benefit to society 
from lifting 8-10% of the courts' burden is readily obvious. An in­
dividual's prosecution of workplace statutes within the recom­
mended workplace dispute resolution system shifts much of an 
administrative compliance agency's workload to a new, privately 
funded system. Parties that use the employment law enforcement 
scheme would pay for resolution of workplace disputes instead of 
the taxpayer-at-Iarge. Employers may complain that a statutory 
plan is merely an added cost for the employer. But unlike any 
other statutory employment program, the cost of this plan is limited 
to only the users of the plan. It will not cost most employers very 
much. And when it does, the most significant costs essentially in­
volve only expenses related to an arbitration, a small fraction of 
that incurred by an employer facing the same claim in court. 
Moreover, the proposed model's impact on the judiciary's time 
can be measured by more than just the number of cases on the 
docket. Verdicts in employment cases are regularly the subject of 
post-trial motions and appeals.272 It is not just issues over the 
amounts of jury awards that are confronted by trial judges after a 
trial, but additionally, demands for attorney's fees and costs are the 
subject of motions, hearings and decisions?73 The proposed model 
would allow both federal and state governments to focus their lim­
ited resources on other issues.274 Government compliance agencies 
will be able to devote their attention to egregious situations and to 
pursuing preventive programs which benefit the public, hopefully 
accomplishing more of their mission while using less tax dollars. 
Time required by pre-trial motions, jury selection, jury needs, side­
bar and in-chamber conferences, researching and preparing jury in­
structions, and post-jury award motions is eliminated with arbitra­
tion, resulting in less legal costs for the employee and for the 
employer, and for a great reduction in the burden on the court 
system.275 
menced in 2002 involved civil rights disputes of employment-related matters. See infra 
at 44 and accompanying notes. 
272. Skrainka, supra note 267, at 991 (asserting that litigants must "endure ap­
peals no matter what the outcome"). 
273. Id. 
274. Reduced case volume has a ripple beneficial effect on necessary court sup­
port systems. The amount of court space, security, clerks, maintenance, all can be re­
duced, or, if already overburdened, can be more efficiently utilized. 
275. For further discussion on how, even though employment and civil rights 
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Moreover, the use of arbitration further benefits society by ex­
pediting the resolution of workplace disputes and implementing a 
system that is accessible to all employees. Criticism of workplace 
arbitration has centered on whether this procedure for resolution of 
disputes is fair.276 Scholarly research has shown that arbitration 
agreements, which are designed to respect the due process rights, 
and the substantive rights of the laws which might form the basis of 
a claim, are juSt.277 Of greater significance, arbitration is more 
likely to achieve workplace justice than present litigation proce­
dures to which many employees do not have access. This is argua­
bly the most significant public benefit of the proposed system since 
substantive laws designed to protect and make victims whole are 
meaningless unless all members of society can seek enforcement. 
The proposed statute, as roughly outlined below, adds nothing of a 
substantive nature, nor does it attempt to define a new legal basis 
for claim resolution. Instead, it orients employers and employees 
involved in interstate commerce to resolving rather than contesting 
claims, thereby reducing the resulting detrimental impact on morale 
and the overall economy's productivity.278 
2. The Model 
The model proposed in this Article is not revolutionary. In 
fact, scholars and organizations, including the Uniform Law Com­
missioners, have proposed statutory-based schemes that would 
transplant the current litigation model with an arbitration forum in 
return for a "just-cause" employment standard.279 Effectively, 
cases make up a significant portion of the federal courts docket, that very little of the 
courts time is actually taken up by the actual adjudication of such claims see Adam 
Liptak, US Suits Multiply, But Fewer Ever Get to Trial, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 
2003, at 36. 
276. See discussion supra Part III. 
277. See Skrainka, supra note 267, at 1000-03 (providing drafts of provision for 
arbitration of statutory claims). 
278. Another benefit to society is that by placing the burden of forum costs onto 
the private actor, employers will be encouraged to implement programs/procedures that 
reduce the likelihood of breaching employees' protected rights in the first place. 
279. See Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Employment Termination Act of 
1991, available via Westlaw under Uniform Laws annotated Database. See also Theo­
dore St. Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination Act, 69 WASH. L. 
REV. 361 (1994). META was proposed as a possible answer to the disadvantages of the 
employment-at-will doctrine and the cost to employers when an exception is found. 
Under the proposed uniform law, META sought to find some middle ground in which 
employees are protected from wrongful terminations under common law theories and 
employers are protected from huge awards when they are adjudicated to be wrongfully 
terminated utilizing arbitration as the method for resolution. For an approach that sug­
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those proposals would have a major impact on the substantive law 
in the employment context while the mechanisms proposed here 
are much more modest.28o Moreover, exchanging litigation for an 
available and accessible remedial procedure for employee claims is 
a tried and tested system in different contexts. For example, 
worker's compensation systems are an area of "tort reform" where 
employers are mandated to pay into an insurance program that pro­
vides no-fault benefits to injured employees and the injured em­
ployee is barred from suit.281 The suggested model in this Article 
would keep the substantive workplace law in tact while changing 
the way in which workplace disputes are procedurally handled. The 
effects of such a model are twofold: (1) it streamlines the current 
nature of workplace litigation into a mandatory system that re­
quires all individual workplace disputes to be resolved through 
mandatory binding arbitration, and (2) it legislatively prescribes the 
content and reach of arbitration agreements in a way that ensures 
fairness for all parties. 
a. The Compulsory Model 
One of the major aims of the proposed workplace model is to 
streamline the current system of litigation and multiple forums into 
a system where all individual claims can be resolved in a similar 
manner, and in a more efficient, cost-effective way. Existing sub­
stantive law will be applied in deciding a controversy. Existing 
rights and remedies will be maintained. The system should be eas­
ily accessible, and because it will be simple in its design and univer­
sally used for any employment claim, it will be readily understood 
by employees. To achieve this end, the proposed model must en­
compass all individual claims whether based on statutory or com­
mon law and impose a positive duty on employers to incorporate 
not only arbitration, but also, dispute resolution steps that en­
gests broadening META's scope and making it federally preemptive see Befort, supra 
note 29, at 427-29. 
280. Substantive because they would replace the employment-at-will doctrine 
with a just cause standard for the implementation of a procedural forum. Id. 
281. Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform Liability, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 656 
(1990) (book review) (reviewing PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLU­
TION AND ITs CONSEQUENCES (1988». In describing the reason for worker's compensa­
tion as a reason for tort reform, Page states: "The legal process made it virtually 
impossible for people with limited financial resources to vindicate their common law 
rights with any realistic hope of success, and failed to address the more general problem 
of how society should deal with the inevitable toll of industrial accidents and illnesses." 
Id. 
332 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:281 
courage the reporting of workplace disputes and their resolution 
before workplace problems blossom.282 
The proposed system should make sure that a person who files 
a grievance because of an adverse employment action for alleged 
discrimination is not forced to bifurcate his/her claims and have 
them heard in multiple forums. Moreover, it should ensure that 
such bifurcation be unavailable to any party as a mechanism of de­
lay. To accomplish this end, a comprehensive model for workplace 
justice must be compulsory and pre-emptive - reaching all individ­
ual workplace based claims whether grounded in statutory or com­
mon law.283 Moreover, the system should have an effective 
282. Although statutory models that would preempt all workplace-based claims 
whether statutory or common law have been suggested before, none has addressed the 
issue of whether such statutes would constitutionally be permitted to preempt substan­
tive state-based claims and seem to assume that such preemption is permissible. See, 
e.g., Befort, supra note 29, at 398-400. 
Although the issue is not within the scope of this Article, readers should be mind­
ful that the question of whether federal law can preempt state-based procedures for 
enforcing their own substantive laws is an open one. Some scholars, such as Jean Ster­
nlight, suggest that the preemptive scope of the constitution does allow this. Jean R. 
Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Bind­
ing Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Pro­
cess Concerns, 72 TuL. L. REV. 1, 70 (1997) ("While many state constitutions contain a 
provision that similarly protects the right to trial by jury, it would seem that a federal 
statute would be permitted to trammel a mere state constitutional right."). However, if 
such pre-emption is not permissible, it is this author's opinion that the proposed model 
in this Article could be tailored to encompass solely federal based claims, or, alterna­
tively be tailored to preempt substantive state laws in a way consistent with constitu­
tional concerns. For a general discussion on the open question of whether a federal 
statute that requires a state court to apply federal procedural requirements for state-law 
claims violates the commandeering principle see Wendy E. Parmet, Issues State Courts 
Face When Considering Federal Preemption of State Court Procedures, available at 
http://216.239.57.104/search?q=cache:6WUIRWtHHHcJ:www.roscoepound.org/new/02 
Parmet.pdf++%22Congress©an'j[reempt%22+%22state'j[rocedure%22&hl=en&ie=UT 
F-8 (2001). In addition, this Article is mindful of the fact that certain causes of action 
that are often the basis for workplace related claims-such as certain civil rights claims 
arising out of § 1983-are afforded Seventh Amendment protection. See 15 AM. JUR. 
2D Civil Rights, § 160 (2004). Such claims cannot be mandated as part of a federal 
scheme which does not encompass a right to jury trial. However, there is nothing that 
would prohibit the proposed federal workplace dispute statute from allowing employers 
the option of incorporating such contractual waivers into their dispute resolution pro­
grams so long as the procedural safeguards within the proposed statute were not devi­
ated from. 
283. It is important to emphasize that the proposed model does not attempt to 
incorporate actions against non-employees under employment or labor statutes. Such 
actions should lie outside of the compulsory arbitration statute. For example, actions 
that allege unlawful secondary boycotts under the NLRA would not be covered within 
the employer's required dispute resolution program. Whenever a charge filed at a fed­
eral or state administrative agency involved an allegation that an individual's statutory 
right with respect to hire, employment, termination, benefits, or conditions of employ­
333 2004] ACCEPTING EVOLUTION IN WORKPLACE JUSTICE 
mechanism to ensure that agency claims defer to the arbitration 
process. So, for instance, where an individual employee has filed a 
complaint with the EEOC or state agency, any agency investigation 
would await the resolution of the arbitration process.284 
The compulsory nature of the system must require the adop­
tion of a dispute resolution system that codifies the lesson of 
Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton.285 Employers must develop clearly 
stated policies against unlawful discrimination and clearly stated re­
porting procedures for any employee who feels that he or she has 
been discriminated against.286 Such programs should require the 
reporting of workplace grievances and require exhaustion before 
ment has been violated and the agency determines that it would otherwise have juris­
diction over the charge, the agency will suspend processing the matter and will defer it 
to proceedings before the employer's dispute resolution plan. Moreover, although the 
focus of this Article is not to iron out all the possible implications of the model on each 
existing type of claim, an illustration by way of unemployment compensation claims is 
worth discussing. Contested claims for unemployment insurance at the hearing or ap­
peal stage will have to be resolved through the arbitration step in the employer's dis­
pute resolution system. The preliminary unemployment insurance proceedings would 
be administered as at present by the various states' agencies. The reason that disputed 
claims will have to be resolved through the arbitration step is that the underlying fact 
situation most often involves matters that could constitute other claims subject to the 
dispute resolution system. It will be imperative for the effectiveness of the arbitration 
step that unemployment insurance appeal proceedings not be abused for discovery pur­
poses or duplicate arbitration hearings and proceedings. The aim of the statute is that 
there be but one hearing to resolve all disputes between employer and employee. The 
arbitrator will have to apply the substantive law that governs the unemployment insur­
ance claim which in most states differs from the standards used to evaluate whether 
there is a viable claim under other statutes. However, of practical importance is (1) 
avoiding a delay in an individual obtaining the unemployment benefit, and (2) the stat­
ute of limitations on bringing future statute based claims. One option is if a subsequent 
statutory claim is pursued, to require it be heard before the same arbitrator to incorpo­
rate the original unemployment insurance appeal record in the record to be supple­
mented but not duplicated. 
284. Government agencies would not be blocked by these programs from pursu­
ing enforcement of their statutory missions; however, the statute will provide for defer­
ral by the applicable government agency, federal or state, to arbitration of any claim 
involving adverse action against an individual based on an alleged violation of law. 
285. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
286. Id. at 806. An employer's failure to have a clearly stated policy against un­
lawful discrimination and a clearly stated reporting procedure for an individual em­
ployee who feels he/she has been discriminated against is a factor that might excuse an 
employee's failure to notify the employer of the harassment. The effect of this case is 
that, as a practical matter, employers are likely to develop in-house reporting and dis­
pute resolution procedures to avoid the unfortunate circumstance of being held liable 
for a hostile work environment that was never within their line of vision. If required as 
part of the proposed statutory scheme, the minimum requirements to establish a 
"proven and effective mechanism" of resolving hostile work environment, as well as 
other claims, will be easier to arrive at. Id. at 807. 
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arbitration is allowed.287 The reasons for such a requirement are 
plenty. First, requiring reporting and voluntary resolution proce­
dures would motivate employers to screen out clearly meritorious 
claims through settlement or conciliation. Moreover, depending on 
the size and nature of the organization, required reporting and vol­
untary pre-arbitration resolution measures will alert employers to 
unfair employment practices within their organization at stages 
where prophylactic measures can be implemented to prevent fur­
ther breach. In effect, on many levels required pre-arbitration steps 
in such a system would promote positive solutions to addressing un­
fair workplace practices before they escalate or become patterns 
within an organization or department - deterring and preventing 
discrimination or wrongful employment action in harmony with ex­
isting statutes. Finally, such a required step would be cost effective. 
A system that directs disputes to turn to arbitration only as a last 
resort - when the internal mechanisms required of employers fail ­
encourages cost effectiveness by saving the most costly mechanisms 
for the most troubling and novel situations. 
b. Procedures 
The second major feature of the proposed workplace dispute 
resolution model is clear requirements of mandatory arbitration. 
As stated previously, the critics of arbitration continue to maintain 
that contracts of mandatory arbitration as a pre-condition of em­
ployment are biased in favor of employers primarily because em­
ployers can control the design and they are offered on a take-it-or­
leave-it basis.288 Specifically, the critics seem most concerned with 
issues related to the selection of arbitrators, discovery, and the lack 
287. At minimum, it seems that employers should be required to adopt a report­
ing mechanism for workplace grievances. However, nothing in the statute should pre­
vent employers from instituting more exhaustive procedures. For example, an 
employer could adopt several preliminary steps similar to the multi-step grievance pro­
cedures that appear in labor contracts and which are also used in many non-union com­
panies. Or, employers might voluntarily include mediation among these preliminary 
steps. Trained mediators should succeed in reducing the costs of arbitrations through 
successful conciliation and eliminating the need for moving a claim into the hearing 
stage of arbitration. Conciliation of competing claims or positions at the preliminary 
step will further both workplace justice and workplace productivity. For a general dis­
cussion on mediation see Vivian Berger, Employment Mediation in the Twenty-First 
Century: Challenges in a Changing Environment,S U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 487, 517-43 
(2003). 
288. Beth M. Primm, Comment, A Critical Look at the EEOC's Policy Against 
Mandatory Pre-dispute Arbitration Agreements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 151, 151 
(1999) (citing fears of the EEOC). 
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of written record.289 Although existing case law and arbitration 
protocols provide a rough outline of the minimum requirements 
that a mandatory arbitration contract must contain to be fair and 
enforceable, attorneys must currently wade through a plethora of 
state common law of contract when drafting such agreements. This 
approach has its difficulties, especially when the employer is a 
multi-state employer: how can one draft an agreement that is proce­
durally fair and enforceable in all jurisdictions? 
In order to eliminate the kinds of procedural unfairness claims 
that are raised by the critics of arbitration, the proposed model for 
workplace justice would require that employment dispute resolu­
tion programs meet minimum fairness standards. This should be 
achieved in several ways. First, there would need to be a very clear 
and understandable explanation of the procedure for initiating a 
matter within the employment dispute resolution system and for in~ 
itiating the arbitration component of the system.290 Forms that 
would trigger the matter need to be available and published to all 
employees.291 In addition, the statute would necessarily require 
that an employee or employer begin proceedings under the dispute 
resolution system within the substantive statute's period of limita­
tions or a common law statute of limitations for claims arising out 
of tort or contract.292 Moreover, to ensure that the proposed model 
complies with most workplace laws, especially discrimination laws, 
the dispute resolution procedure must be available to all employ­
289. See generally Befort, supra note 29, at 430. 
290. The United States Supreme Court has announced that although the amount 
of process due varies with the circumstances it must be "reasonably calculated, under all 
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 
them an opportunity to present their objections." Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft 
v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705 (1988) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). In a system where arbitration is statutorily prescribed 
and must contain certain minimum standards, there is no reason why notice of the fo­
rum and its procedures cannot be written down. 
291. For example, employers might be required to distribute a handbook not un­
like a summary plan description that is required pursuant to ERISA. Posters might be 
required to be posted in places where employees are likely to see them, outlining the 
procedures and rights available to employees pursuant to the plan. 
292. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894-95 (9th Cir. 
2002) (explaining, on remand from the Supreme Court, that the Dispute Resolution 
Agreement (DRA) was unconscionable in part because it narrowed the statutory reme­
dies available by narrowing the statute of limitations). See also Sternlight, supra note 
225, at 93-94. Although Sternlight is extremely opposed to mandatory arbitration, she 
is seemingly resolved that the Supreme Court will not change its precedent any time 
soon and, thus, Sternlight makes a solid argument for why statute of limitations periods 
should not be limited. 
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ees, including applicants, on the same basis as the statute on which 
the claim is based.293 Additionally, there would have to be proce­
dures for allowing third parties that have valid interests in a claim 
to enter into the dispute resolution process. Separate claims involv­
ing the same parties could be merged by an arbitrator into one 
hearing, provided that the prerequisite procedural steps occurred. 
The objective in the dispute resolution plan is to resolve any claim 
that one party has against another, based on a matter central to the 
original claim.294 
In order to ensure that there will be full and fair consideration 
of all the relevant facts involved in a dispute, discovery must be 
permitted of all parties.295 However, unlike the process of litigation 
that often allows those interests with the deepest pockets to go on 
fishing expeditions,296 the discovery would be much less extensive 
than in court litigation. Thus, there should be a liberal discovery 
process whereby parties are expected to disclose and exchange all 
non-privileged information, including documents that are relevant 
to the dispute or claim that they possess, or control, and upon which 
they intend to rely in support of their position or which they intend 
to introduce as evidence. Names of all individuals with knowledge 
about the dispute or claim, identities of all experts who may be 
called upon to testify, and the names of all persons that may be 
witnesses will also have to be exchanged. This would be done pur­
293. Under this model, where arbitration is made compulsory by the state, it 
would be inconsistent to allow a party that was not hired because of a purported dis­
criminatory practice to have the claim settled through litigation while mandating that 
current employees resolve their disputes via the arbitration process. 
294. It is important to stress here that action against non-employees or non-em­
ployers under employment or labor statutes would lie outside the scope of compulsory 
arbitration. For example, actions that allege unlawful secondary boycotts under the 
NLRA would not be covered within the employer's required dispute resolution pro­
gram. Whenever a charge filed at a federal or state administrative agency involved an 
allegation that an individual's statutory right with respect to hire, employment, termina­
tion, benefits, or conditions of employment has been violated and the agency deter­
mines that it would otherwise have jurisdiction over the charge, the agency will suspend 
processing the matter and will defer it to proceedings before the employer's dispute 
resolution plan. 
295. Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psych care Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 684 
(Cal. 2000) (employees are "at least entitled to discovery sufficient to adequately arbi­
trate their statutory claim, including access to essential documents and witnesses"). 
296. Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778, 787 (9th Cir. 2002) 
("Adequate discovery, however, does not mean unfettered discovery. As Armendariz 
recognized, an arbitration agreement might specify 'something less than the full pano­
ply of discovery provided in [California] Code of Civil Procedure."'). 
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suant to an arbitrator's overall supervision of the pre-hearing dis­
covery process. 
The primary differences between the discovery process pro­
posed here and the discovery process in litigation are the recom­
mended limits on the number of individuals that a party could 
depose prior to the hearing, and the time afforded to depositions of 
other persons with knowledge about the dispute. In addition, this 
proposal seeks a small time frame in which depositions, interrogato­
ries, and exchanges or information can take place. The reasons for 
this are clear. One of the benefits of the arbitration forum is the 
certainty that access to information is not only expedient, but will 
not require unnecessary costs. Although an arbitrator could be em­
powered to determine, upon the requests of the parties, that addi­
tional information or time should be granted,297 granting such 
requests should be the exception, not the rule. 
The discovery process should also mandate that the employer 
be obligated to produce all witnesses necessary to the resolution 
that it employs or has under its control, thereby dispensing with the 
need for subpoenas and further decreasing the costs of the claim­
ant. Additionally, the arbitrator would be empowered to issue sub­
poenas for the attendance of other individuals as witnesses, or for 
the production of documents,298 without further intervention from 
the court.299 
The arbitrator would be in complete charge of the hearing and 
would determine the order of proof.300 Witnesses would be re­
quired to testify under oath. An arbitrator would consider evidence 
that he or she finds relevant and material to the dispute, giving it 
297. This option should be kept open especially in arbitrations involving McDon­
nell-Douglas-type employment discrimination where circumstantial evidence forms the 
basis of a prima facie case. Currently the AAA utilizes this standard in its National 
Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (Including Mediation and Arbitration 
Rules) As Amended and Effective on January 1, 2004, available at http://www.adr.org/ 
index2 . 1 . jsp ? JSPssid = 16235 & JSPsrc = upload \ live site \ focusArea / employment\ 
employment\AAA121current.html#n7. "The arbitrator shall have the authority to order 
such discovery, by way of deposition, interrogatory, document production, or otherwise, 
as the arbitrator considers necessary to a full and fair exploration of the issues in dis­
pute, consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration." Id. 
298. Currently, arbitrators do not always have the legal authority to subpoena 
witnesses. See http://www.adr.orglindex2.1.jsp?JSPssid=16235&JSPsrc=upload/livesite/ 
Rules_Procedures/AD R_ Guides/fact -subpoenas.htm!. 
299. Arbitrators should also be invested with the power to rule on objections to 
subpoenas. 
300. It is anticipated that the order of proof in arbitration would be similar to that 
of a court trial. 
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such weight as the arbitrator determines appropriate. Guidance for 
that purpose would be found in the Federal Rules of Evidence or 
other applicable judicial rules of evidence. However, since it would 
be an arbitration hearing, strict conformity to rules of evidence 
would not be necessary.3D! Due process would simply require that 
each party be afforded the opportunity to present material and rele­
vant evidence to the arbitrator. Parties would bear the same bur­
den of proof and burden of producing evidence as would be 
required of them had their claims or counterclaims been brought in 
court pursuant to the statutes upon which they rely. Witnesses for 
each party would be required to submit to direct and cross-exami­
nation as overseen and approved by the arbitrator.3D2 A record of 
the proceedings would be made before a court reporter authorized 
to administer oaths. In appropriate circumstances the parties could 
agree, pursuant to the arbitrator's approval, to waive oral hearings 
and to submit the dispute to the arbitrator for a decision based 
upon written submissions and other evidence upon which the par­
ties agree. 
The location of the arbitration hearing would be near the 
workplace.3D3 In the absence of an agreement as to the site, the 
arbitrator would determine the appropriate location for the 
hearing. 
Selection of the arbitrator is one of the primary issues when 
dealing with procedural fairness. One of the difficulties of selecting 
the arbitrator is that often employers have an advantage during the 
traditional labor relations process of striking names since they, or 
their counsel, tend to be more familiar with arbitrators' records 
than the employees. However, the proposed statute deals with 
these concerns by re-conceptualizing the way in which arbitrators 
are selected. Under this system, independent privately funded arbi­
trators, not government-financed personnel, will serve as arbitra­
tors. Those not-for-profit, independent arbitration administrative 
agencies, like the AAA, that have a mission of dispute settlement 
301. However, due process does require that evidence be allowed in a forum. 
See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938) (the right to a "full hearing" 
implies a right to present evidence). 
302. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261, 267-68 (1970) (it is a violation of 
due process to allow termination of AFDC without allowing recipient opportunity to 
present evidence orally and confront any adverse witness). 
303. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (although the 
Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to make an adequate evidentiary 
showing of unfairness, the Court opined that in a future case, a due process argument 
based on unfair geographic form might exist upon a stronger factual showing). 
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and maintain rosters of trained and experienced individuals, would 
be the source of arbitrators. These agencies would have to train 
and certify individuals as arbitrators. Either prior to a disputed 
claim,304 or at the time a claim is moved to arbitration, one of these 
agencies would appoint the arbitrator who hears and decides the 
issue in controversy. One arbitrator - either selected from the list 
submitted by the appointing authority, or appointed for the hearing 
by the appointing authority, or selected on a pre-determined basis 
from a panel previously appointed - would hear and decide the 
controversy. An appointed standing panel would expedite the mat­
ter and avoid altogether the machinations parties currently employ. 
Under the proposed statute, it is critical that certain criteria be 
established to ensure that arbitrators are neutral and equipped to 
handle the issues common to workplace-related disputes.305 For ex­
ample, there should be no personal or financial interest in the result 
of the proceedings or any relation with the employees, employer, or 
management of the employer. In order to have the confidence of 
all parties, and to produce the superior re!:,ults that such a system 
would be designed to accomplish, arbitrators would be required, at 
a minimum, to have experience in both employment law and work­
place labor relations. They would have to be licensed attorneys, 
knowledgeable in federal and applicable state employment laws 
and in discrimination laws.306 It would also be desirable that they 
have a minimum number of years of experience, such as five or ten, 
in arbitrating and deciding employment law and employment-re­
lated or labor controversies, or in representing parties in such mat­
304. Arbitrators could be named in advance of a specific dispute. The employer, 
for example, could request the appointment of a number of arbitrators to resolve issues 
that may arise between the workforce and the employer; in essence, a private panel 
from which the arbitrator would be designated. The arbitrator who hears a particular 
matter could be selected on a rotating basis from that standing panel appointed by the 
independent agency. In order to eliminate any issue of perceived bias on the part of an 
appointed arbitrator who may be interested in being appointed in future cases, arbitra­
tors once appointed would be appointed for a specific term. A standing panel of arbitra­
tors further serves the objective of reducing the perception of bias. An alternative is 
that each time an issue arises, one of the recognized independent arbitration adminis­
tration agencies (e.g. American Arbitration Association) appoints a qualified individual 
to serve as the arbitrator. 
305. Due Process under the Constitution requires that decision makers be unbi­
ased. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1980) (stating that, while 
Due Process Clause requires decision-maker be unbiased, there is no impermissible bias 
just because the DOL gets back a portion of a fine assessed against violators of child­
labor laws). 
306. Arbitrators need not be admitted to practice as lawyers within the state in 
which a specific controversy is heard. 
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ters. Parties would be allowed to request the appointment of 
arbitrators who are experienced in resolving employment issues in­
volving their industry or their jobs, especially where the jobs are 
unique to a particular employer or industry (e.g., higher education, 
police enforcement). The appointing agency would be required to 
appoint arbitrators on a non-discriminatory basis and the arbitra­
tors would be required to meet all of the qualifying criteria of the 
appointing agency. 
c. Decisions and Appeal 
One of the most important aspects of workplace justice is that 
arbitrators and parties have a baseline from which to predict the 
outcome of any dispute. In other words, because the proposed 
model would usurp the existing model of employment litigation, it 
is necessary to prescribe mechanisms for both the development of 
the law and for a record that can be used for appeal when the arbi­
trator clearly departs from existing legal precedent.307 For example, 
it would be necessary for the statute to require that decisions be in 
writing and that they stipulate both the findings of fact, as well as 
conclusions of law, upon which the decision was based. In keeping 
with arbitration's expedited nature, there would be a fairly limited 
period during which the arbitrator could consider the issues and 
draft the decision. The arbitrator would be required to apply ex­
isting decisions and established legal precedent of courts having ju­
risdiction over the parties in the dispute, including relevant statutes 
of limitations, to the facts that the arbitrator finds during the arbi­
tration proceedings. The arbitrator would be authorized to award 
any remedy permitted by an applicable statute, including damages, 
pre- or post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees, and expenses upon 
which a claim has been brought. In situations where claims are not 
upheld, the arbitrator would nevertheless be permitted, in accor­
dance with present protocols, to award filing fees and/or attorneys' 
fees or some portion thereof to unsuccessful claimants.308 How­
ever, this practice would only occur for substantive reasons and 
would have to be pursuant to a written decision of the arbitrator in 
307. Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 241 (1999) (discussing the pros and cons of ex­
panding the scope of judicial review in arbitration). 
308. Model Employment Termination Act (META) § 7(e)-(f); this view is in ac­
cord with decisions holding that a fact-sensitive inquiry will determine whether arbitra­
tion fees were prohibitive in the ability of a party to bring a claim. See, e.g., Brasington 
v. EMC Corp., 855 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. App. 2003). 
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which he or she describes in detail the basis of the decision. The 
award of the arbitrator would be considered a final and binding de­
termination between the parties, including third parties as to all 
claims arising out of, or related to, the matter in dispute. 
If necessary, a party could enforce or confirm an award pursu­
ant to the Federal Arbitration Act or applicable state law. An ac­
tion to vacate an award could only occur for the established reasons 
for vacating an arbitrator's award, or where an arbitrator made a 
substantial error of law in applying an applicable statute or a prior 
body of decisionallaw.309 
CONCLUSION 
This Article describes the evolution of workplace law and the 
role played by arbitration in that evolution. Over the course of the 
past century, many of the workplace statutes enacted were designed 
to meet isolated employment needs. By and large, these new stat­
utes rarely considered, and were not coordinated with, other em­
ployment regulations. Instead, each tended to contain its own legal 
enforcement procedures unrelated to then existing workplace 
processes. As society identified additional workplace needs, layer 
upon layer of legal obligations and legal procedures piled upon em­
ployers and employees. 
In the 21st century, the evolution of workplace law must con­
tinue. The experiences and empirical studies of workplace disputes 
dictate that the current methods of resolving workplace claims be 
replaced with a scheme more fitting with the needs of the present. 
Multiple layers of forums and procedures must be folded into one 
universal system. Effective, swift, inexpensive, accessible work­
place justice must be the end. A federal omnibus workplace legal 
procedures act, like the one suggested here, incorporating arbitra­
tion with a statutory object of resolution must be the means. 
The 21st century employment relationship and workplace is 
309. Although an appeals process which allows for appeal even in the case of an 
error at law is necessary, there are several options available. For example, Congress 
might decide to allow arbitration appeals to the district court by either party. Alterna­
tively, there is the possibility of creating an appeal board consisting of three arbitrators, 
for example, appointed by the designating agency after notice of the appeal is received 
by the designating agency. In either case, the standard for review should be the same ­
a prohibition. Model Employment Termination Act § 7(e)-(f); this view is in accord 
with decisions holding that a fact sensitive inquiry will determine whether arbitration 
fees are prohibitive in the ability of a party to bring a claim. See, e.g., Brasington v. 
EMC Corp., 855 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. App. 2003). 
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very different from that of the mid-20th century. Unfortunately, 
much of our present adjudication of workplace disputes and work­
place regulation reflects antiquated assumptions and needs. Today, 
nearly all employment involves or impacts interstate commerce. In 
addition, attitudes of employees and of employers towards the em­
ployment relationship are much different than they were fifty years 
ago. Employees and the work they do have become more mobile ­
the 21st century employer does not expect employee allegiance for 
a lifetime, nor do employees expect job security for a lifetime.310 
Still, employment disputes inevitably arise and the failure of the 
modern workplace to provide unilateral procedural mechanisms for 
enforcement of workplace laws makes maintaining healthy work­
place relationships difficult. The need for a new approach for 
countenancing workplace controversy is clear. 
Last century, the Supreme Court noted that labor arbitration is 
a substitute for workplace strife while commercial arbitration is a 
substitute for litigation.311 Moreover, the Court observed that 
"questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard 
for the federal policy favoring arbitration."312 This Article's recom­
mendation adopts and marries these Supreme Court observations. 
It recognizes the recent increase in both workplace strife and com­
merciallitigation, and offers a new solution based upon a tested and 
court-approved system renowned in the workplace for its effective­
ness; a system whose time is now in the evolution of the American 
workplace and pursuit of workplace justice. The suggested statute 
will bring benefit to all without creating a loss. Arbitration is tried 
and tested. It works! It benefits the employee. It benefits the em­
ployer. It benefits society and the economy. It is where American 
workplace justice is headed. In the 21st century, there needs to be 
substantial cost reduction in the expense of pursuing and defending 
employment disputes, increased accessibility to workplace justice ­
in short, a race to resolution rather than a race to lawyers. This 
Article's suggested approach - the enactment of a federal omnibus 
workplace dispute resolution procedures statute - will accomplish 
that end. 
310. Befort, supra note 29, at 421 ("[A] 'boundaryless workplace' [i]s the new 
norm in which workers expect 'employability security' rather than continued employ­
ment with a single employer") (citing Katherine V. W. Stone). 
311. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
312. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983). 
